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Three main parachutes decelerate a solid rocket booster for water impact.
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TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM
SPACE SHUTTLE SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER MAIN PARACHUTE
DAMAGE REDUCTION TEAM REPORT
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This report gives the findings of the solid rocket booster (SRB) main parachute damage reduction
team (MPDRT). The MPDRT was formed at the request 1 of the SRB Chief Engineer at Marshall Space
Flight Center (MSFC) following the main parachute failure that occurred on STS-30R, May 1989. The
team was chartered to review the history of previous failures, investigate methods of eliminating or
substantially reducing main parachute deployment damage, provide government-estimated costs for any
recommended changes, and, specifically, to reassess the STS-30R failure mechanism.
Personnel from MSFC and the SRB prime contractor, United Space Boosters, Inc. (USBI),
comprised the majority of the MPDRT. The organization and membership of the team is shown in figure
1. R. Runkle, of the SRB Chief Engineer's Office, served as team coordinator. D. Bacchus and
1. Burnum headed the MSFC and USBI efforts, respectively. D. Wolf, from Sandia National
Laboratories, and B. Woodis and F. Tallentire, from the Martin Marietta Corporation, served as
parachute system consultants. J. Butler of Rockwell International, Huntsville Operations, provided
technical writing assistance.
R. RUNKLE
MSFC
CORPORATION SANDIA NATIONAL 1
B. WOODfS LABORATORIES
F. TALLENTIRE D. WOLF
MSFC
GROUP LEADER
D. BACCHUS
_ COST ANALYST)G.DODD
-- TRAJECTORIES, G. WATTS
-- LOADS, P. HAYS
STRESS, G. JAMISON
AERO/PERF., J. HENGEL
-- DESIGN, T. DOWLING
SRB INTERFACE, J. WHITE
MATERIALS, R. HARWELL
USBI
GROUP LEADER
J. BURNUM
-- PROGRAM MGT., P. MCFADI3EN
--TRAJECTORIES, M. CARPENTER
-- PARACHUTE DESIGN, F. GANT
-- STRUCTURAL DESIGN, J. GENTRY
-- MATERIALS, J. SCARPA
-- STRESS, P.ZAVAREH, J.ROTH
-- PARACHUTE ANALYSIS, B. LAYFIELD
-- OPERATIONS, B. RUTLEDGE
Figure 1. SRB main parachute damage reduction team.
Theteamheld its first meetingJune23, 1989.After aseriesof planningsessions,MSFCand
USBI personnelmet separatelyfor severalweeksto allow thetwogroupsto formulateindependentideas
addressingmainparachutedeploymentdamage.Theideaswerelatercombinedin joint meetings.The
teamdeveloped23damagereductionconcepts,listedin figure 2.Eachconceptandits evaluationby the
teamarediscussedin appendixA. Theteamalsodiscussedvariousmainparachuteenhancements,which
arediscussedin section6.0.Theteam'srecommendationsarediscussedbriefly in paragraph1.4andare
listedformally in section8.0.
In October1989,theteampresentedtheresultsof its investigationto MSFC management.2
During thesubsequentcompilationof thisreport,MSFCdecidedto implementseveralof theteam's
recommendations.Section9.0providesadiscussionof theimplementationactivities.Thepublicationof
thisreport is consideredthecompletionof theteam'sentireassignment.
CONCEPT NUMBER CONCEPT NAME
1
2
3
3A
4
4A
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Shorten lsogrid
Delete Isogrid
Pilot Chute-Deployed Soft Pack
Pilot Chute-Deployed Soft Pack (Frustum Mounted)
Soft Pack With Delayed Release From Frustum
Soft Pack With Energy Absorber (Frustum Mounted)
External MPSS
Banana Bag
Longer Drogue Suspension Lines
Clustered Drogue
Larger Drogue
Increase Time on Drogue
Optimize Ties for Vent Cap and Canopy
Soft Pack With Mortar-Type Deployment
MPSS Fairing to Frustum Exit
Split Isogrid
Separation Plane Moved Forward
Lower Main Chute Pack in Frustum
Frustum Fairing
Individual Rigid Containers
Jettison Nozzle Extension at Apogee
Bridle-Deployed Soft Pack on Dome
Energy Absorber-Deployed Soft Pack on Dome
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Figure 2. Damage reduction concepts.
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1.1 General Description of SRB Recovery System
The SRB recovery system is contained within the nose cone (fig. 3) and consists primarily of a
pilot parachute, drogue parachute, and three main parachutes. The main parachute packs are supported
and separated by the main parachute support structure (MPSS) which is attached to the frustum. The
MPSS consists of a forward ring, isogrid, and six bipod struts as shown in figure 4. The isogrid is
composed of three machined panels joined at the center and held in a 120 ° spacing by the forward ring.
The parachute packs are secured to the MPSS by circumferential and longitudinal straps. The MPSS
absorbs nearly all the parachute inertial loads and transfers these loads to the frustum through the
forward ring and the bipod struts. The small remaining inertial loads are handled by 24 lateral restraint
straps attached to cinch fittings around the circumference of the frustum.
NOSE CAP
STATION 200 /
NOSE CAP ACCESS DOORS (3)
120" APART
FRUSTRUM
MAIN PARACHUTE (3)
DROGUEPARACHUTE
COMPARTMENT
(CONTAINSPILOTCHUTE
MOUNTED ATOP DROGUE
CHUTE PAC_
NOSE CAP THRUSTER (3)
STATION 275
FRUSTUM ACCESSDOOR
STATION 318
FLOTATION
FLOTATION
CURTAIN
FRUSTUM
SEPARATION RING
STATION 395
PANEL (3)
BIPOD STRUTS (6)
Figure 3. SRB nose cone assembly.
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The recovery sequence, shown in figures 5a and 5b, begins with separation of the nose cap at an
altitude of approximately 15,000 ft. As the nose cap separates, it deploys the pilot parachute which, in
tum, deploys the drogue parachute. The primary purpose of the drogue parachute is to orient the SRB in
a tail-first attitude suitable for deployment of the three main parachutes. At an altitude of approximately
6,000 ft, the frustum, which contains the main parachute deployment bags, is severed from the SRB
forward skirt. The drogue then deploys the main parachutes by decelerating the frustum away from the
SRB. The main parachutes decelerate the SRB for water impact.
Originally, the SRB recovery system used 115-ft diameter main parachutes. These parachutes, now
called small main parachutes, produced a nominal water impact velocity of 89 ft/s. To reduce the damage
caused by water impact, 136-ft diameter large main parachutes were developed, bringing nominal water
impact velocity down to 75 ft/s. The large mains were first flown on the fight hand (RH) SRB on STS-41D
in August 1984. They were next used two flights later on both STS-51A SRB's, followed by STS-51C, the
last flight with small mains. Beginning with STS-51D, the large mains have been used exclusively.
1.2 Primary Damage Sources and Previous Corrective Measures
Throughout the history of SRB flights, the main parachutes have frequently been damaged during
the deployment process. On several occasions, this damage has resulted in a complete failure (collapse)
of the canopy. Appendix B contains a comprehensive parachute damage history and cause assessment for
the first 29 shuttle flights and an analysis of the correlation of the damage with various parameters.
The team found two primary causes of significant deployment damage: vent entanglement and
contact of the parachutes with components of the MPSS, namely, the isogrid and bipod struts. MPSS
contact is, by far, the most frequent of all damage sources. The potential for contact and damage is
increased when the frustum tilts during canopy deployment. Damage potential is further increased by the
high bag stripping velocities inherent in the current system, which utilizes the drogue parachute to
deploy the mains.
Following early incidents of parachute damage or failure, steps were taken to reduce the potential
for damage. These included removing the frustum location aid, repositioning the main chute floats, plac-
ing foam around the bipod struts and lower section of the frustum, and eliminating the sharp corner of
the isogrid near the SRB centerline. In addition, several changes were made to the main parachute
packing procedure.
Despite these improvements, damage and failures still frequently occurred. A change was, there-
fore, implemented to make the main chutes more tolerant to localized damage. Beginning with STS-33R
in November 1989, circumferential reinforcements, called ripstops, were installed on a trial basis on one
main parachute on each SRB. The intended function of the ripstops is to prevent the propagation of
chute tears along any gore during inflation. This modification, however, does not eliminate the causes of
the damage.
The ripstops are 4,000-1b nylon horizontal ribbons that are sewn on top of the existing ribbons at
six locations in the upper, highly loaded portion of the canopy (fig. 6). After several trial flights, this
modification proved successful, and the decision was made to fully implement the ripstops on a perma-
nent basis. Beginning with the first flight in 1991, all three main parachutes on each SRB have had rip-
stops installed.
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Figure 6. Main parachute ripstops.
1.3 Vent Entanglement (STS-30R Failure)
So far in the shuttle program there has not been a failure of more than one main parachute on the
same booster. However, on the STS-30R left-hand (LH) SRB, a serious situation arose when the failure
of one main parachute was coupled with delayed inflation of another. The resulting loss in drag caused
the third parachute in the cluster to become highly overloaded to the point of near-failure. The fact that
the third parachute had not sustained any damage during deployment is the only reason it did not fail.
Failure would have resulted in loss of the LH SRB.
The team, as requested, closely examined the 5TS-30R failure to verify the poStfiight analyses by
the SRB prime contractor (USBI) 3 and Dr. Wolf of Sandia National Laboratories. 4 The t_am examined
essential photographic data from STS-30R and viewed a video-taped demonstration of the failure
sequence performed by recovery personnel using the failed parachute. In addition, several team mem-
bers had been previousiy involved in the postflight inspection of the failed parachute.
After reviewing the data from STS-30R and thoroughly discussing the sequence of events during
deployment, the team agreed with the original conclusion that vent entanglement caused the STS-30R
parachute failure. As would be expected, the team members did not agree totally on every detail. The
i
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teamdid, however,agreethatthevententanglementwascausedby absenceof ventcapsupportcom-
binedwith frustumtilt duringdeployment.Themostlikely sequenceof eventsin theSTS-30Rfailure is
asfollows:
After frustum separation,theunsupportedventcapbecameinvertedduring frustum
deceleration.The largefrustum tilt angleresultedin vent cap lateraldynamicsthat
causedthe vent cap to becomeasymmetricalduring deployment.This asymmetry
prevented the proper exit of the vent cap from its inverted position, and a portion of
the vent cap struck and protruded through another section of the vent cap. This
entanglement then caused a foreshortening of the vent band and horizontal ribbons
(fig. 7). The large radial loads normally transferred across the top of the canopy
through the vent lines were redistributed as hoop tension loads in the horizontal
members. This abnormal load distribution caused the canopy to fail.
Based on a reexamination of earlier failures, it now appears that the damage observed on STS-51B
was also a result of vent entanglement. The STS-30R failure, therefore, was not a random occurrence but a
clear indication of a deficiency in the vent packing procedure.
RADIALS
VENT
Vent entanglement caused
foreshortening, which overloaded
and failed the horizontal members.
LINES
HORIZONTAL
,RIBBONSIN
VENT CAP
"VENT BAND
Figure 7. STS-30R main parachute failure mechanism.
1.4 Recommendations
The team recommends that the main parachute packing procedure be changed immediately by
adding vent cap ties to support the vent cap as described in paragraph 6.1. The team also recommends
implementation of a pilot chute-deployed soft pack (section 2.0). This conventional method of deploying
parachutes eliminates all damage caused by contact with hard structure (MPSS and frustum). This
concept is also the best method to reduce the current high bag stripping velocities. Three lower-cost
alternative concepts (section 3.0) that eliminate contact with the MPSS, the most frequent source of sig-
nificant damage, are also recommended.
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2.0 RECOMMENDED CONCEPT: PILOT CHUTE-DEPLOYED SOFT PACK
A soft pack deployed by a pilot parachute (concept 3) is the approach recommended to provide
the least probability of main parachute damage. This concept is similar to the system now used to deploy
the drogue parachute, and has long been preferred by most parachute designers. The soft pack is so
named because it has no structure to interfere with deployment of the canopies. This concept was inves-
tigated in some detail in 1984 and 1985 and documented in references 5 and 6.
2.1 Concept Description
The concept 3 configuration is shown in figure 8. The advantage of using a pilot parachute for
main chute deployment is that it greatly reduces bag stripping velocities compared to the current system.
This pilot chute will be called the cluster pilot chute to differentiate it from the existing pilot chute that
deploys the drogue.
CLUSTER PILOT CHUTE BAROSWITCH FRUSTUM
DEPLOYMENT (RELOCATED)
BRIDLE AND
ENERGY ABSORBER STATION 275
CLUSTER PILOT
CHUTE
STATION 31B
CUT LOOP
CLUSTER
RETENTION
STRAPS
STATION 401
ADDITIONAL CLUSTER
FLOATS SUPPORT (BETWEEN FLOATS
CLUSTER RETENTION AND INBOARD OF FLOATS)
RATCHETS ( RELEASE FORWARD
FROM SRB AT WATER DOME
IMPACT)
Figure 8. Concept 3 configuration,
In concept 3, the MPSS is eliminated, and the main parachute packs are mounted on the forward
dome of the SRB forward skirt. The load of the main parachute packs must be distributed over the sur-
face of the forward dome. This load distribution is achieved by contouring the upper and lower surfaces
of the main parachute floats to fit the bottom of the cluster and the top of the dome. Additional foam
support blocks are inserted to form nearly continuous top and bottom surfaces. Recesses in the foam
support blocks allow space for the main chute risers.
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The mainparachuteclusteris heldin placeby aretentionstraparrangementsimilar to that of the
currentdrogue.Thetopendsof theretentionstrapsaresecuredby acut loop.Severingthecut loop by
meansof cuttersduringclusterpilot deploymentreleasesthecluster.Thebottomendsof theretention
strapsareanchoredto ratchetsmountedaroundthecircumferenceof theforward dome.Themainchute
clusteris thuscantileveredout from its mountingsurface.After mainchutedeployment,thefreeendsof
theclusterretentionstrapscouldentanglewith themainchutefloatsandinhibit their releaseat water
impact.Therefore,theratchetswill bereleasedfrom theSRBat waterimpactby explosiveboltsfired
with thesamesignalthat releasesthemainriserattachfittings.
Theclusterpilot chuteis mountedatopthecenterof themainparachutecluster,requiringreloca-
tion of theSRBbaroswitchasshownin figure 8. A multileggedmainbridle transfersextractionloads
from theclusterpilot chuteto themainchutebags.Thebagsmustberigidizedto acceptthis load.The
preferredmethodusesarigid liner in thetopof eachmaindeploymentbag,similar to thehardcoverin
thecurrentdroguebag.Theliner will preventdeformationof thetopof thebagduringmainparachute
deployment.For additionalrigidity, thethreemainparachutebagsarelacedtogetheratthetop, downthe
outboardcorners,andatthebottomwheretheymeetin thecenter.
2.1.1 Deployment Sequence
The deployment sequence for concept 3 is shown in figure 9. The sequence through frustum sep-
aration is identical to the existing system. After the frustum moves approximately 7 ft from the SRB, the
deployment bridle connecting the frustum to the cluster pilot parachute bag becomes taut, and the loads
are transmitted through an energy absorber to the cluster pilot bag to pull it from the main parachute
cluster. After the cluster pilot chute bag moves a predetermined distance, circular knives sever the cut
loop to release the cluster retention straps. When the cluster pilot chute starts to inflate, the cluster is free
to be deployed. After main parachute deployment, the cluster pilot chute, together with the main
parachute deployment bags (which have built-in flotation), descend to the ocean surface and are
retrieved for reuse.
2.1.2 Cluster Pilot Parachute Size
The team estimated that a cluster pilot chute 23 to 25 ft in diameter is required to deploy the
main chute cluster. Analysis is required to trade cluster loads, bag stripping velocity, and suspension line
sail before the final size is selected.
The cluster pilot chute weight for a nylon system is in the range of 100 to 150 lb depending on
the size and deployment conditions. Use of Kevlar will result in a weight savings.
The energy absorber used for deployment of the cluster pilot chute is expected to have a trans-
mitted force of less than 6,000 lb with a 10-ft stroke. Its weight is under 10 lb.
2.2 Assembly
Concept 3 requires considerable changes in assembly operations at Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
in the parachute refurbishment facility (PRF) and assembly and refurbishment facility (ARF). In the cur-
rent clustering procedure in the PRF, the MPSS is supported at the lower outboard comers of the isogrid
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Figure 9. Concept 3 deployment sequence.
panels while the chute packs are being attached. Without an isogrid, the chute packs must be supported
from underneath by a new clustering stand. The top surface of the new stand is a replica of the top sur-
faces of the parachute floats and additional foam supports, including recesses for main chute risers° Each
main chute pack is placed on the stand and nested accurately on its support surface. The three chute bags
are then laced together at the top and down their adjoining corners, and an access hole in the clustering
stand permits the bags to be laced together at the bottom where all three bags meet. The cluster retention
straps are put in place, and the cut loop is installed along with the cutters. The retention straps are passed
down the sides of the packs and attached with temporary ties to retain them until later. As the cluster
pilot chute is being mounted on top of the cluster, its main bridle legs are connected to the main chute
bags, and the cutter lanyards are connected to the cluster pilot chute pack.
The new clustering stand will also serve as a transportation dolly for transfer of the cluster from
the PRF to the ARF. A new clustering sling is required to lift the cluster from the dolly.
Integration of the recovery system and the SRB forward skirt in the ARF starts with installation
of the floats, additional foam supports, and main riser attach fittings. The cluster is placed on the floats.
The main risers are connected to the main riser attach fittings, the float risers are connected to the main
risers, and the cluster retention straps are attached and tensioned. The frustum is then lowered into place
and connected to the forward skirt. The cluster pilot chute deployment bridle is attached near the top of
the frustum, after which the drogue, pilot chute, and nose cap are installed in the current manner.
2.3 Weight Delta
Concept 3 is expected to weigh 100 to 200 lb less than the current system. Elimination of the
MPSS more than offsets the added weight of the cluster pilot chute, main chute bag flotation, and cluster
retention hardware. No structural changes to the frustum or forward skirt are included in this estimate.
2.4 Development Description
2.4.1 Design
The team performed a preliminary analysis of the cluster retention loads on the forward skirt
components. Results indicate that the forward skirt ring is capable of taking the retention strap loads
since they would be less than the loads caused by the main riser attach fittings. The bulkhead stresses on
the forward dome would be lowered by 11 to 30 percent with the exception of a 5-percent increase in
localized bending stresses. The stress reduction is caused by the cluster load counteracting the internal
pressure load occurring at high altitude.
A more detailed stress analysis is required to ensure that the forward skirt is qualified to sustain
the loading. This analysis may indicate the need for a total redesign of the structure. If so, the team pro-
poses that alternative recommended concepts be pursued (see section 3.0).
2.4.2 Testing
Because concept 3 is almost totally new, it requires more testing than the other recommended
concepts. The new cluster pilot chute will undergo seam and joint tests, and its performance will be vali-
dated by rocket sled testing. The energy absorber for the cluster pilot chute will be tested, and the
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deploymentof theclusterpilot chuteby thefrustumwill beverifiedby rocketsledtest.Anotherrocket
sledtestwill verify the ability of the cluster retention system to withstand the lateral load experienced
during SRB reentry. A static pull test will be performed for the three main chutes. After all these tests
are completed, a series of drop tests will be conducted to verify the ability of the cluster pilot chute to
deploy the main chutes. See section 4.0 for a description of these tests.
In addition, a frustum water impact test will be conducted to assess the effect of MPSS removal.
Structural requaiification tests will be performed for the forward skirt and frustum.
2.5 Development Schedule
The concept 3 development schedule is shown in figure 10.
Event
Preliminary Design
Preliminary Design Review
Detailed Design
Test Equipment Design
Test Equipment Fabrication/Refurb.
Test Item Fabrication
Tests
Critical Design Review
Months
2 4 6
I ,
Figure 10. Concept 3 development schedule.
2.6 Costs
The estimated cost of implementing concept 3 is $9M. A significant portion of the cost is allo-
cated to the test program to develop the new deployment method. Other one-time costs are associated
with fabrication of the new cluster pilot parachutes and bags, replacing the current inventory of main
parachute deployment bags, and any required frustum and forward dome modifications. The cost of new
equipment at KSC to assemble the chute packs is not included in the $9M estimate.
Implementation of concept 3 increases operations costs approximately $20K per flight,
attributable primarily to packing, retrieval, and refurbishment of the cluster pilot parachute. Cost and
cost amortization comparisons with other recommended concepts are provided in section 5.0.
w
m
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3.0 ALTERNATIVE RECOMMENDED CONCEPTS
This section presents three alternative concepts that provide a substantial reduction in deploy-
ment damage at lower total cost than the pilot chute-deployed soft pack. These concepts are recom-
mended as viable alternatives because they eliminate the most frequent cause of significant damage,
contact with the isogrid and bipod struts. All three concepts use the drogue parachute to deploy the
mains, as does the current system.
3.1 Concept 2: Delete Isogrid
3.1.1 Concept Description
In concept 2, the isogrid and bipod struts are removed. The major drawback of this change is that
it also removes the current means of supporting the main parachute packs under axial and lateral load
conditions. In concept 2, axial support is achieved by a support structure at the top of the cluster. Lateral
support is achieved by filling the present space between the chute packs and frustum with foam support
blocks so that the cluster load passes directly to the frustum. The primary factor in the development of
this concept is the extent to which the frustum can react the cluster lateral loads. Before this concept is
adopted, a static lateral load test (described in paragraph 4.5) is required to establish the structural
capability of the frustum. If testing proves this load condition to be undesirable, a more positive lateral
restraint system would be required to maintain the parachute packs within a prescribed envelope.
Paragraph 3.2 describes a recommended concept (external MPSS) which eliminates parachute pack
contact with the frustum.
3.1.2 Assembly
Assembly of the main parachute packs without an isogrid requires a new clustering stand. The
support surfaces of the new stand would be contoured to properly position the chute packs for attach-
ment to the upper support structure. The three packs are then laced together at the outside corners, after
which the circumferential straps are installed. The cluster is then ready for installation of the frustum and
connection of the 24 lateral restraint straps, as in the current procedure.
3.1.3 Weight Delta
Implementation of concept 2 is expected to reduce system weight by approximately 350 lb,
assuming no structural reinforcements are required.
3.1.4 Development Description
3.1.4.1 Design
The only significant new hardware required is the support structure at the top of the cluster,
which provides axial restraint. This structure will use the upper bay of the current isogrid, most likely
requiting some reinforcements. Other existing hardware will also be used, including ring segments, ring
splice fittings, and the gussets and spacers mounted on the ring segments.
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3.1.4.2 Testing
Cluster lateral load tests, both static and dynamic, must be performed to ensure that the frustum
can withstand the lateral loads of the cluster during SRB reentry. A static pull test and a dynamic
deployment test are required to determine the effects of large tilt angles during main chute deployment
without the isogrid. See section 4.0 for a description of these tests. In addition, water impact and struc-
tural requalification tests are required for the frustum.
3.1.5 Development Schedule
The development schedule for concept 2, shown in figure 11, includes the static lateral load test
required before proceeding with this concept.
II I II Ill I
Event
Preliminary Design
Preliminary Design Review
Detailed Design
Test Equipment Design
Test Equipment Fabrication/Refurb.
Test Item Fabrication
Tests
Critical Desil_n Review
Figure 11.
Months
2 4 6 8 10
....
$*
........... • ........... • .......................
* *
............................
$
1
Concept 2 (delete isogrid) development schedule.
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3.1.6 Costs
The initial cost of implementing this change is approximately $2M, associated primarily with
testing. The operations costs are reduced because refurbishment of the isogrid is eliminated.
3.2 Concept 5: External MPSS
3.2.1 Concept Description
In concept 5, the isogrid is eliminated, and the parachute packs are supported by an external
MPSS (EMPSS). The EMPSS is d conical container externally reinforced with structural legs located
120 ° apart (fig. 12). The parachute packs bear directly on the EMPSS skin, which extends down to
station 38 i. Below station 3gl, a separate frustum fairing iS used to provide each parachute with a
smooth, continuous exit from _e frustum. The deployment sequence for the system remains unchanged.
i
|
i
i
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Figure 12. EMPSS configuration.
The EMPSS upper structure provides axial support and incorporates existing MPSS components
where possible. These include ring segments, ring splice fittings, the gussets and spacers mounted on the
ring segments, and the uppermost bay of the isogrid. A yoke fitting fastens to the existing ring splice
fitting and serves as an upper attach point for the structural legs, as shown in figure 13. The yoke fitting
will not interfere with assembly of the existing ring segments. The structural legs will probably consist
ISOGRID
UPPER BAY
(3) GUSSET(3)
RING SEGMENT (3)
EMPSS
YOKE FITTING*
(3)
RING SEGMENT
RING SPLICE
FITTING (3)
*NEW COMPONENTS
Figure 13.
EMPSS
LEG"
(3)
EMPSS upper structure.
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of one hat-section per yoke fitting. EMPSS skin sections attach to the structural elements with flush fas-
teners. Additional stiffeners can be attached around the circumference of the EMPSS if stress analysis
indicates they are necessary.
Bipod struts transmit cluster lateral loads to the frustum (fig. 14). Dual fittings are used to attach
the EMPSS to the bipod struts and frustum fairing. The bipod struts, which are shorter than the current
configuration, are attached at their outer ends to the existing cinch fittings.
EMPSS
STRUCTURAL
LEG*
EMPSS
SKIN*
EXISTING
FRUSTUM
STRUCTURE
EXISTING
CINCH
FITtiNG
(24)
EMPSS DUAL FITTING*
FRUSTUM FAIRING*
STATION 381
SHORTENED
BIPOD STRUT*
(s)
*NEW COMPONENTS
Figure 14. EMPSS lower structure.
3.2.2 Assembly
Because the isogrid is eliminated, a new clustering stand is required for assembly of the main
parachute packs with the EMPSS. The support surfaces of the new stand would be contoured to properly
position the chute packs to allow the EMPSS to be lowered onto them, aligned, and attached.
Re _sernbiecl EMPSS with mainparachutes installed is joined to the frustum in essentially the
same manner as the current system. Attachment of the upper portion is identical. Attachment of the
lower portion is nearly the same. After the bipod struts are installed, the main parachute bag lateral
restraint straps are attached to the existing cinch fittings through slots around the perimeter of the
EMPSS, The slots are oversized to prevent abrasion. The frustum fairing is then attached to the EMPSS
dual fittings. No changes are anticipated for the attachment of the frustum to the forward skirt.
m
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3.2.3 Weight Delta
The weight of the EMPSS is expected to be approximately 200 lb greater than the current MPSS,
depending on the amount of structural stiffening required around the circumference.
3.2.4 Development Description
3.2.4.1 Design
Design of the EMPSS structure is expected to be relatively simple. Study items during this phase
include material selection and manufacturing methods. The use of composites for the EMPSS skin could
result in a weight savings compared to aluminum. The use of a fabric curtain for the frustum fairing
should also be considered.
3.2.4.2 Testing
Testing of the EMPSS includes the cluster dynamic lateral load test, static pull test, and dynamic
deployment test described ifi section 4.0. Structural requalification and water impact testing of the frus-
tum with EMPSS are also required.
3.2.5 Development Schedule
The schedule for development of the EMPSS is shown in figure 15.
Event
Preliminary Design
Preliminary Design Review
Detailed Design
Test Equipment Design
Test Equipment Fabrication/Refurb.
Test Item Fabrication
Tests
Critical Desi[n Review
Months
16 18 20 22 24
Figure 15. EMPSS development schedule.
3.2.6 Costs
The one-time cost associated with implementation of the EMPSS is approximately $3.5M, which
includes all design, testing, and the MPSS inventory replacement cost. This cost is partially offset by a
reduction in operations costs of approximately $10K per flight, resulting from the use of the frustum
fairing in lieu of instafoam in the frustum lower bay. Both the installation and removal of the instafoam
is a labor intensive process.
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3.3 Concept 4A: Soft Pack With Energy Absorber (Frustum Mounted)
3.3.1 Concept Description
In concept 4A, energy absorbers are used to release the main chute cluster from the frustum prior
to deployment of the canopies. The is0grid and bipod struts are eliminated to allow easy exit of the clus-
ter. The drogue parachute provides the force to deploy the main parachutes. The energy absorbers serve
the dual function of axially supporting the main chute cluster during flight and softening the release of
the cluster from the frustum after frustum separation. The energy absorbers must be pretensioned to sup-
port the cluster, and experience has shown that pretensioning actually results in more predictable per-
formance during release. Concept 4A is shown in figure 16.
CLUSTER SUPPORT
ENERGY ABSORBERS
FOLDED AND HAND
TACKED TO TOP OF PACK
FRUSTUM
STATION 275
BOOSTER
SEPARATION MOTORS
C LUSTER SUPPORT
STRUCTURE
STATION 318
CLUSTER LATERAL
SUPPORT (FOAM LOCKS)
MAIN CHUTE RISERS
STATION 401
Figure 16. Concept 4A configuration.
Cluster suppo_ loads are transmitted to the frustum by the same method used in concept 2, i.e.,
axial loads are handled by a cluster support structure above the parachute packs, and lateral loads are
passed directly to the frustum by foam support blocks. Ramifications of this cluster support method are
discussed in paragraph 3.1.1.
3'3.1.1 Deployment Sequence
The deployment sequence is shown in figure 17. The energy absorbers allow the bags to drop
from the frustum before the parachute canopies exit the bags. Since the bags remain attached to the frus-
tum, the bag strip velocity is nearly the same as that of the current configuration.
2O
i
J
PILOT CHUTE " ///
DROGUE BAG "__
DROGUE CHUTE
FRUSTUM
ENERGY
ABSORBERS
MAIN CHUTE
BAGS
MAIN CHUTES
SRB
Figure 17. Concept 4A deployment sequence.
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3.3.1.2 Energy Absorber Requirements
The team conducted a preliminary analysis of energy absorber requirements to demonstrate the
feasibility of concept 4A. The energy absorbers must be strong enough to support the chute packs during
SRB reentry (4.5 G's, rigid body) but still allow the packs to exit the frustum for deployment. The
analysis showed that designing the energy absorbers to provide 9 G's to the parachute packs is close to
optimum, and the calculations descnq_e_e following paragraphs are based on the 9-G value.
To simplify the energy absorber analysis, the frustum and drogue parachute were combined into
a single rigid body weighing 6,200 lb. The cluster of three m_n parachute packs, which weighs 6,300 lb,
was also considered to be a rigid body. The total energy absorber force requiredtodecele_te the chute
packs at 9 G's was 56,700 lb. In considering the design of the energy absorbers, mild (low dynami c
pressure) frustum separation conditions are more critical than severe conditions. Mild conditions dictate
a decrease in energy absorber strength, and thus provide less margin relative to the reentry G level. A
mild dynamic pressure of 122 lb/ft 2, corresponding to an SRB descent velocity of 358 ft/s, was calcu-
lated for the time of frustum separation. A minimum drogue chute drag force of 181,000 lb was assumed
for the dynamic pressure calculation. No other aerodynamic forces were considered.
The analysis begins at frustum separation, with the drogue chute providing the force to decelerate
the frustum and the chute packs away from the SRB. The energy absorbers begin to stroke immediately,
applying a constant 9-G deceleration to the chute packs. The initial deceleration of the frustum and
drogue is 20 G's, taking into account the constant energy absorber force. After frustum separation, the
frustum and drogue continue to decelerate, although the deceleration quickly decreases because of the
rapid reduction in dynamic pressure. The chute packs continue to exit the frustum as the energy
absorbers stroke with constant force. The energy absorbers must continue to stroke until the chute pack
velocity matches frustum velocity. This condition occurs at approximately 0.45 s after frustum separa-
tion. At this time, the energy absorbers have stroked 9.4 ft, and the chute packs have completely cleared
the frustum. Only 29 ft of riser length has been deployedby th_ time, and the bag S_pping velocity is
roughly 130 ft/s. From this point on, the drogue decelerates the frustum and chute packs together until
the main parachutes are fully deployed. The parachute canopies do not deploy until well after the chute
packs have exited the frustum.
Energy absorber length is determined by the highest expected dynamic pressure at frustum sepa-
ration. The energy absorbers must have enough stroke to prevent snatching the bags during high
dynamic pressure c0nditionsl The estimated energy absorber weight is 90 lb based on the use of nylon
webbing. This weight can be reduced by 50 percent if Kevlar is used for the energy absorber material.
3.3.2 Assembly
The concept 4A assembly procedure is similar to that of concept 2 (paragraph 3.1.2) except for
attachment of the chute packs. Energy absorbers are used to attach the chute packs to the cluster support
structure, and the 24 lateral restraint straps are omitted.
3.3.3 Weight Delta
Implementation of concept 4A isexpected to result in a recovery system weight reduction of 200
to 250 lb. Elimination of the isogrid and bipod struts more than offsets any additions for energy
absorbers or cluster support structure.
|
22
3.3.4 Development Description
3.3.4.1 Design
The primary design concern for concept 4A is to ensure that the energy absorbers can support the
cluster during SRB reentry. The accelerations measured on flight SRB's must be carefully examined in
terms of both rigid-body and flexible-body values. The energy absorbers are pretensioned and will prob-
ably release the cluster prematurely if exposed to high frequency accelerations that exceed the break-out
strength. Such a release is unacceptable because the packs would be banged around inside the frustum
by violent SRB motions during reentry.
3.3.4.2 Testing
Like the other two alternative recommendations, drop tests are not required for concept 4A.
Adequate ground testing will be performed to certify the concept for flight. The energy absorbers will be
developed by a series of laboratory tests. The complete energy absorber system and chute packs will
then be installed in a frustum for rocket sled testing to ensure proper release of the cluster by the energy
absorbers. This test cannot be used to simulate deployment of the main chutes from their bags because
the bags drop down after exiting the frustum. The deployment of the mains will be certified by similarity
to the current system, or by a specially designed rocket sled test. A static pull test also will be performed
for the mains.
Because the isogrid is eliminated, the cluster lateral load tests, frustum water impact test, and
structural requalification tests specified in paragraph 3.1.4.2 for concept 2 are required.
3.3.5 Development Schedule
Figure 18 gives the concept 4A development schedule. The schedule, like that for concept 2,
includes the initial static lateral load test required before proceeding with concept 4A.
Event
Preliminary Design
Preliminary Design Review
Detailed Design
Test Equipment Design
Test Equipment Fabrication/Refurb.
Test Item Fabrication
Tests
Critical Design Review
Months
2 4 6 8 10
....... 4
........... 4 ........... 4 ........... _ ........... 4
12 14 16 18 20 22 24 !
..........................................
Figure 18. Concept 4A development schedule.
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3.3.6 Costs
The one-time cost associated with this concept is estimated to be $5M. This cost primarily
includes testing of the energy absorbers, replacing the current inventory of main parachute deployment
bags, and all required frustum testing.
Operations costs will increase by approximately $15K per _ght due primarily to the energy
absorbers. A comparison of these costs and cost amortization with other concepts is provided in section
5.0.
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4.0 DEVELOPMENT TESTING
Parachute-related tests required to develop the recommended damage reduction concepts include
material strength tests, cluster pilot parachute load tests, static pull tests, dynamic deployment tests, clus-
ter lateral load tests, and drop tests. These tests are described below. In addition, structural requalifica-
tion tests and water impact tests are needed. The tests required for each recommended concept are sum-
marized in figure 19.
Recommended Concept
Delete Isogrid - Concept 2
EMPSS - Concept 5
Soft Pack With Energy Absorber
(Frustum Mounted) - Concept 4A
Pilot Chute-Deployed Soft Pack -
Concept 3
Tests Required
Cluster static and dynamic lateral load tests; static pull
test and dynamic deployment test for mains; water impact
test and structural requalification for frustum.
Cluster dynamic lateral load test; static pull test and
dynamic deployment test for mains; water impact test and
structural requalification for frustum with EMPSS.
Cluster static and dynamic lateral load tests; static pull
test for mains; energy absorber laboratory tests; rocket
sIed test to verify cluster release; water impact test and
structural requalification for frustum.
Seam and joint tests for cluster pilot; rocket sled tests
for cluster pilot performance; laboratory tests for cluster
pilot energy absorber; dynamic deployment test for
cluster pilot using frustum; cluster dynamic lateral load
test; static pull test for mains; drop tests to verify the
ability of the cluster pilot to deploy the mains; water
impact test for frustum; structural requalification for
frustum and forward skirt.
Figure 19. Development test summary.
4.1 Material Strength Tests
Tests in this category include seam and joint tests for the new cluster pilot chute (concept 3). The
strength of each seam and joint must be validated by a test or by similarity to existing seams and joints.
It is anticipated that few tests of this type will be needed. Testing is performed in standard tensile testing
machines such as the Tinius-Olsen machine in the PRF.
Also, in this category are laboratory tests for the development of the various energy absorbers
and a rocket sled test for concept 4A to verify release of the cluster from the frustum by the energy
absorbers. The rocket sled test will use the multiple sled arrangement described in paragraph 4.4. All
rocket sled testing for the recommended concepts will be performed at Sandia National Laboratories in
New Mexico.
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4.2 Cluster Pilot Parachute Load Tests
The performance of the new cluster pilot chute will be validated by rocket sled testing like that
used recently for the pilot chute that deploys the drogue (see paragraph 7.2). A prime objective of this
test is to determine the opening shock factor. The test chute is installed in a test vehicle mounted on a
pop-up sled. At the appropriate sled speed (25 percent over design dynamic pressure), the test vehicle is
ejected upward to 150 to 200 fl and the test chute is deployed. Parachute loads and test vehicle accelera-
tions are measured by instrumentation on the test vehicle. Laser tracking measures velocity and position,
and onboard and track-side photography records chute deployment.
4.3 Static Pull Tests
Static pull tests will be performed on any new or modified main chute configuration. A cluster of
three large main chutes is installed in the test rig to allow horizontal extraction. The frustum must be
included if the configuration is not a soft pack. The cluster or the frustum is oriented at a base-up angle
to simulate tilting during deployment. The ends of the risers are pulled horizontally away from the
packs. As each increment of the parachute emerges from the pack, it is suspended from overhead tracks
to minimize friction. Extraction loads are measured continuously to establish break-out loads for the bag
flap, line, and canopy element release events. Video photography records the entire extraction, and still
photography records specific events. This technique has been successfully used at the PRF.
4.4 Dynamic Deployment Tests
A rocket sled will be used to conduct dynamic deployment tests for concept 2 (delete isogrid)
and concept 5 (EMPSS). For these two concepts, the parachute bags remain in the frustum. The system
to be tested is mounted on two sleds that simulate the two major moving elements--the SRB and the
frustum (fig. 20). The sleds are pushed in an "SRB nozzle first" direction by a third (propulsion) sled.
MAIN RISER ATTACH FITTINGS FRUSTUM SEPARATION PLANE
MOUNTED ON SRB SLED /
(RELEASED AFTER CANOPIES /
CLEARFRUSTUM) _ /
FRUSTUM _ SI_BSLED
SLED /%_\ \ /
PROPULSION SLEDS \ / ._ _ /
PROPULSION SLED RIGIDLY CONNECTED _ /1"_ N /
PROPULSION SLED SRB SLED WATER
WATER BRAKE SCOOP NO RIGID CONNECTION BRAKE SCOOP
TO SRB SLED
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Figure 20. Dynamic deployment sled test configuration.
B
i
When the required speed is reached, the propulsion and frustum sleds are slowed by a water brake, and
the heavily ballasted SRB sled coasts along the track to extract the main chutes from the frustum. In
addition to simulating relative velocities of the SRB and frustum, this approach provides the correct
direction for the "relative wind." Immediately after canopy deployment, the main chute risers are
released from the SRB sled. This technique minimizes damage to the canopies caused by dragging along
the track. The frustum sled will be rapidly decelerated to prevent it from running over the chutes.
Instrumentation includes onboard and track-side photography of chute deployment and laser tracking, or
the equivalent, to develop frustum and SRB velocities.
In addition to testing main parachutes, this sled arrangement can be used to verify the deploy-
ment of the cluster pilot chute for concept 3 (pilot chute-deployed soft pack). The cluster pilot chute bag
would remain attached to the SRB sled until the frustum sled begins to decelerate. The bridle connecting
the frustum to the cluster pilot bag would then snatch the bag away from the SRB sled and deploy the
cluster pilot chute. No main chutes are used in this test.
4.5 Cluster Lateral Load Tests
Two types of lateral load tests are recommended: static tests that provide preliminary information
on the effects of side forces into the frustum from a single parachute pack or from a pair of packs, and
dynamic tests that determine the effects of interactions of the three chutes in a complete cluster.
The static test is a prerequisite to allowing the cluster to be supported directly by the frustum
(concepts 2 and 4A). The frustum to be tested is mounted horizontally and attached to the test rig struc-
ture at station 395. As an option, the frustum can be supported at both ends. A single parachute pack, or
a pair of packs, is placed on the foam support blocks on the lower arc of the frustum at the correct loca-
tion. In the single-pack test (fig. 21), a V-shaped loading pad simulates the adjoining surfaces of the
other two packs and rests on the two fiat surfaces of the pack. In the two-pack test, the loading pad simu-
lates the remaining single pack. The loading jacks pull down on the pack(s) with a force equal to the
design lateral G's times the weight of the complete cluster without the pack(s). Instrumentation
measures the load and strain on the frustum elements.
FRUSTUM SUPPORTED
BY SIMULATED FORWARD
SKIRT_ PAD
LOADING BEAM PACK LOADING
LOADING
JACKS
/
Figure 21. Cluster static lateral load test for concepts 2 and 4A.
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Centrifugetestingis thecustomarymethodof testingthedynamicloadsin thestructure;how-
ever,thereis noknowncentrifugewith thecapacityto carryacompletefrustum/clusterassembly.The
proposedmethodis to mounttheentireassemblyonarocketsledandaccelerateit downthetrack
(fig. 22).By controlling bothaccelerationandwaterbrakedeceleration,clustersideloadsin opposite
directionscanbesimulatedin onerun. If concept3 (pilot chute-deployedsoft pack)is tested,aportion
of theSRBforwardskirt is includedbecausetheclusteris mountedon theforward dome.Instrumen-
tation for theconcept3 testwill recordclusterdeflectionsandforwardskirt loads.For thefrustum-
mountedconfigurations(concepts2, 5,and4A), instrumentationwill measurethedeflectionsin the
surroundingstructure.Accelerationwill bemeasuredfor all configurations.
PROPULSION SLED
FRUSTUM SLED
T.,CK/
WATER BRAKESCOOP
Figure 22. Cluster lateral load sled test configuration for concepts 3, 2, 5, and 4A (concept 3 shown).
4.6 Drop Tests
The team investigated the suitability of the SRB drop test vehicles (DTV's) for testing concept 3,
and the availability of a B-52 aircraft to perform the tests. The objective of these tests is to study
parachute deployment rather than demonstrate parachute strength. As a result, high altitude over-speed
tests are not needed.
Two DTV's and associated support equipment have been in storage since 1984 at the Naval
Weapons Center at China Lake, CA. DTV- 1 may be in need of some structural repair after damage sus-
tained during a 1984 drop test. DTV-2 is in satisfactory structural condition. Both DTV's have been
stored outdoors and will require extensive refurbishment of their electrical wiring. The bomb loaders
used in mating with a B-52 aircraft will also require refurbishment.
'In preparation for testsof the=large main parachu_s in 1983_ bgth DTV's were modified to meet
new B-52 interface requirementsl These re_uirerrients prevent the installation of a cluster of three main
_arachutes together with t_e SRB drogue arid pilot chutes, However, since concept 3 does not require the
SRB drogue and pilot chutes, the DTV's can accommodate the concept 3 configuration of three main
chutes and a cluster pilot chute.
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Figure 23 shows the proposed configuration for testing concept 3 in DTV-2. A contoured surface
is incorporated into the DTV to simulate the tops of the floats and additional foam supports on which the
cluster rests in the flight configuration. The cluster is secured to this surface by flight configuration
retention straps. The cluster and cluster pilot chute are contained in a cluster cover which simulates the
inside of an SRB frustum. The cluster cover is released by explosive nuts and deployed by an extraction
chute in the same way that the nose cap was deployed in previous SRB recovery system drop tests. The
DTV can be ballasted to produce a release weight less than in previous tests and a center of gravity (CG)
inside the required envelope (fig. 24).
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Figure 23. DTV-2 configuration for concept 3 drop test.
The team investigated the availability of the B-52, serial No. 008, maintained at Dryden Flight
Research Facility in California. The 1989-1990 B-52 program included F-111 escape module tests,
Pegasus launches, and shuttle braking chute tests. None of these activities affected the DTV/B-52 inter-
face. Additional Pegasus launches and F-111 escape module tests are planned for 1991 and 1992, but
there should be adequate time in the B-52 schedule to conduct the concept 3 drop tests beginning in late
1991. The team concluded that this aircraft is the best choice for the drop test program, and that the tests
should be conducted at the Naval Weapons Center at China Lake, CA.
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DESCRIPTION
DTV MAIN BODY (NO BALLAST PLATES)
FLARE (INCLUDING INSTRUMENTATION PLATFORM)
AVIONICS
FINS
FORWARD BALLAST PLATE
FLARE BALLAST PLATES (41.60 LB/PLATE, 40 PLATES)
MAIN CHUTE CLUSTER AND ATTACH HARDWARE
CLUSTER PILOT CHUTE
CLUSTER COVER (FRUSTUM SIMULATOR)
EXTRACTION CHUTE
VANE CHUTE (EXTRACTION CHUTE DEPLOY)
SLUG GUN
TOTAL DTV
WEIGHT
(LB)
28,811.60
7,405.30
129.10
253.00
1,458.00
1,664.00
6,549.00
150.00
1,500.00
150.00
5.00
5.00
48,080.00
X- CG
STATION
(INCHES)
63.76
339.09
300.00
368.00
55.90
358.00
412.00
447.00
427.00
466.00
466.00
466.00
179.65
I DTV X - CG ALLOWABLE RANGE 177.56 TO 182.86
Figure 24. DTV-2 mass properties for concept 3.
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5.0 COST COMPARISON AND AMORITIZATION STUDY
The team assessed the costs of each major recommended damage reduction concept taking into
account initial investment, changes in operations costs, and savings due to damage reduction. It was
decided to calculate the number of shuttle flights it would take to pay back the initial investment given a
specific lowered risk of SRB loss per flight. Thus, the initial investment was amortized over a calculated
number of shuttle flights. Parachute ripstop is a damage reduction concept that has already been imple-
mented, and all recommended concepts were evaluated with ripstop in place. Calculation of the payback
period for ripstop itself is shown as an example.
5.1 Assumptions
1. If two or more chutes fail, complete SRB loss--$35,000,000.
2. If single chute fails--S400,000 loss--incremental water impact damage.
3. Chute failure incidence = 4 failures/15.5 flights = 0.258 per shuttle flight (based on the first
31 SRB's successfully recovered by large main parachutes without ripstops).
4. The failure rate of one chute in a two-chute cluster is 1.5 times the failure rate of one chute in
a three-chute cluster.
5. Ripstop alleviates 75 percent of chute failures.
5.2 Nomenclature
PFR3--Failure rate per chute for a three-chute cluster.
PFR2--Failure rate per chute for a two-chute cluster.
5.3 Analysis
PFR3 = 0.258/6 = 0.043 per chute use without ripstop.
PFR2 = 0.043×1.5 = 0.0645 -- expected failure rate per parachute for a two-chute cluster without
ripstop.
The likelihood of two chutes failing is the product of separate probabilities, shown below.
Probability of chutes 1 and 2 failing is:
PFR3xPFR2
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However,wehavethreecombinations:1and2, 1and3, 2 and3.
Probabilitiesof any twochutesfailing is:
3×PFR3×PFR2= 0.00832perbooster,or 0.01664pershuttleflight.
Probabilityof two or threechutesfailing is:
2x(3><PFRaxPFR2+PFRax(PFR2)2) = 0.0170 per shuttle flight.
Thus, we would expect to lose a booster every (0.017) -1 = 58.8 shuttle flights (without ripstops). (We
would also expect to lose two or more chutes for every 0.25810.017 = 15.2 incidents of single chute
failure.)
Continuing the example, the monetary risk per flight without ripstop is:
0.017x$35,000,000+0.258><$400,000 = $595,000+$103,200 = $698,200
With parachute ripstop fully incorporated, it is anticipated that the parachute failure incidence
will be reduced by 75 percent. Therefore, the parachute failure incidence is 0.258/4, one-quarter the pre-
ripstop rate. However, the incidence of two chutes failing is not one-quarter the pre-dpstop rate. It is
one-sixteenth because the two-chute failure probability is the product of two separate probabilities.
With ripstop, PFR3 becomes 0.04314 = 0.01075, and PFR 2 becomes 0.01075xl.5 = 0.016123
Probability of booster loss becomes:
2x(3xPFR3 xPFR2+PFR 3X(PFR2) 2) = 0.001046 per shuttle flight.
Thus, we would expect to lose a booster every (0.001046) -I = 956 shuttle flights with ripstop installed.
Single chute failure would be expected to occur every (0.258/4) -1 = 15.5 shuttle flights.
Monetary risk with ripstop becomes:
0.001046x$35,000,000+(0.258/4)x$400,000 = $36,610+$25,800
= $62,410 per shuttle flight with ripstop.
5.4 Amortization Equation
The payback period in number of flights for any modification is:
PBP (mod) = TI(mod)/(MR(base)-MR(mod)-OPS Change(mod))
where PBP (mod) is the payback period, TI(mod) is the total initial investment for the modification,
MR(base) is the baseline monetary risk per flight before any new modification ($698,200 before
ripstop or $62,410 after ripstop), MR(mod) is the new monetary risk per flight with the modification in
32
place,andOPSChange(mod)is thechangein operationscostsper flight with themodificationin place
(positiveif operations costs increase and negative is operations costs decrease).
If the change in operations costs is a savings, it serves to pay back the investment sooner.
To calculate the payback period for ripstop in our example, the following parameters are used:
TI(mod) - $780,000
MR(base) = $698,200
MR(mod) = $ 62,410
OPS Change (mod) = $ 0
The payback period for ripstop thus becomes:
PBP = $780,000/($698,200-$62,410-$0) = 1.2 shuttle flights.
5.5 Results
The results of the amortization exercise are summarized in figure 25 for ripstop and the recom-
mended concepts. The ripstop modification was assumed to be fully implemented when each recom-
mended concept was evaluated. Ripstop greatly lowered the previously large monetary risk associated
with each flight, and limits to some extent the degree of improvement available from future modifica-
tions. The vent cap ties concept is a relatively inexpensive change that will correct the vent entanglement
problem. Because it was anticipated that this change would soon be incorporated, the four other recom-
mended concepts in figure 25 were evaluated with the vent cap ties included.
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Figure 25. Cost amortization results.
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6.0 MAIN PARACHUTE ENHANCEMENTS
The team identified a number of desirable improvements for the main parachute system and has
grouped them under the general category of enhancements because of their ease of implementation and
low cost. One of these enhancements, vent cap ties (paragraph 6.1), will solve the vent entanglement
problem and is recommended for immediate implementation. Additional enhancements are described in
paragraphs 6.2 through 6.10, and the team recommends that these be considered for implementation at a
convenient time.
6.1 Vent Cap Ties
This change adds canopy bag ties to the vent cap to eliminate main parachute failures caused by
vent entanglement. The current main parachute packing procedure allows the vent to sag into the lower
portions of the canopy during deployment because the vent is not supported in the deployment bag. The
vent cap ties would provide the necessary support and control for the vent during deployment.
6.2 Canopy Vent Apex Tie Lanyard Modification
The present apex tie lanyard does not stroke (i.e., fully extend) for approximately half of its
usages. This modification alters the configuration of the apex lanyard so that it strokes every time, pro-
viding better control of main parachute vent deployment.
6.3 Optimize Canopy Ties
Presently, the canopy ties are 350-1b cotton at all of the canopy tie locations. It is speculated that
using 350-1b cotton at the higher rows of canopy ties aggravates violent vent deployment. This problem
can be alleviated by optimizing canopy tie strength for each row. Before this enhancement can be
implemented, an analysis is required to determine the optimum strength of canopy ties for each row.
6.4 Relocation of Canopy Ties
The canopy tie loops of the present recovery system are located such that the main parachute
canopies do not pull straight out of the pack. The present packing procedure requires the parachute
canopy to be rotated eight gores relative to the position it attains at deployment. It is recommended that
the canopy ties be relocated so that the chutes will deploy without having to rotate into position. This
change should reduce some of the violent deployment dynamics.
6.5 Use of Filament Wound Case Bidirectional Canopy Tie Loops
A minor problem observed during refurbishment operations is that the canopy tie loops are
pulled away from and off of the canopy radials. A modification that should correct this condition is to
replace the present tie loops with the bidirectional tie Ioops designed for the filament-wound case
drogue. When combined with some of the other changes described in this section (e.g., relocation of
canopy ties), this change is easily implemented. It should also reduce tie loop repairs during refurbish-
ment operations.
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6.6 Alternate Vent Line Stacking
At present, the vent lines are stacked such that vent lines 1 and 80 are separated at the center of
the vent by a stack of lines approximately 10 inches high. It is suspected that this separation causes a
load concentration in the vent band. By stacking the vent lines in a different sequence, the vertical sepa-
ration of any two adjacent vent lines can be minimized.
A stacking sequence has been devised by which vent line 80 is placed directly on top of vent line
1, then vent line 2 on vent line 80, vent line 79 on vent line 2, etc. This arrangement will result in a
stacking separation between all vent lines equal to the thickness of one vent line. This method of vent
line stacking is being considered for a patent application.
6.7 Mesh Top for Deployment Bag
This change replaces a section of the top of the main parachute bag with a mesh material, alle-
viating any pressure differential and resulting damage that may occur in the main parachute bag during
deployment and water impact.
6.8 Reduce Number of Reefing Line and Suspension Line Tacks
SRB onboard cameras reveal a restriction to smooth main chute inflation which appears to be
caused by reefing line tacks and suspension line tacks that do not break when required. A solution to this
problem is to eliminate some of the tacks to reduce interference with chute deployment. Analysis is first
required to determine the minimum number of tacks that could be used without negative effects.
6.9 Fabric Liner for Parachute Vent
Main parachutes frequently lag during inflation. It is believed that this condition is mainly caused
by too much parachute vent area. This modification adds a fabric liner to the vent region of the main
parachutes to reduce the effective vent area and thereby improve first stage inflation. Before implemen-
tation, an analysis is required to study the new load paths introduced into the vent region of the
parachute.
6.10 Apply Friction Reducing Material During Refurbishment
The greatest increase of large main parachute friction burn damage occurs during the chutes'
second and subsequent flight uses. It is assumed that the lubricant applied to the material during the
weaving process of the nylon ribbons and webbings is washed out during normal retrieval, defoul, and
wash operations. It is proposed that a lubricant be applied to the parachutes during the normal refur-
bishment procedure at the PRF to restore the original friction burn resistance to the parachutes. A pre-
liminary study indicates that TL-403 is the best candidate for the friction reducing material. TL-403 has
good abrasion reduction characteristics and a minimum of undesirable traits.
35
7.0 RELATED ISSUES
During MPDRT activities, several issues associated with the SRB recovery system were identi-
fied. While these issues may not be directly associated with reducing damage to the main parachutes,
they affect SRB recovery probability and data collection. These issues are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
7.1 SRB Center of Gravity
The most important related issue identified by the MPDRT is the longitudinal position of the
SRB CG during reentry. The SRB has an aft CG location which produces its characteristic tail-f'trst
reentry at high Mach number. During a normal reentry, after the SRB Mach number decreases below
1.0, the trim angle changes to a more broadside orientation. This orientation increases the aerodynamic
drag of the SRB, which provides adequate deceleration and favorable conditions for pilot chute deploy-
ment.
A problem arises when the CG has an extreme aft position. The SRB might not attain the broad-
side orientation as it passes through Mach 1.0, but would remain at a very high angle of attack. The
resulting low aerodynamic drag would cause unacceptably severe deployment conditions, and the
recovery system would fail. The SRB Monte Carlo trajectory simulation indicates vehicle station 1270 is
the critical CG location for recovery. For a reentry CG location aft of station 1270, the possibility exists
for a severe deployment condition.
Thiokol Corporation is considering for future use several motor configurations that would result
in reentry CG locations aft of station 1270. This situation is caused by the need to use some heavyweight
case segments in the aft motor segment to maintain production flow. The MPDRT recommends that this
issue be given due attention.
7.2 Pilot Parachute Capability
The SRB pilot parachute that deploys the drogue was originally designed for a dynamic pressure
of 250 lb/ft 2 at deployment. Because of cost and schedule constraints, the pilot chute load was never
measured during the drop test program or rocket sled tests. As a result, the opening shock effects, which
cause the peak load, were unknown. The capability of the pilot chute could therefore only be estimated.
The maximum predicted dynamic pressure to which the pilot chute could be subjected has
increased since the beginning of the shuttle program because of an increase in SRB weight, an aft shift
in CG location, and the retention of the nozzle extension until just before SRB water impact. Using the
current range of SRB reentry parameters and excluding the extreme aft CG condition discussed in para-
graph 7.1, there exists the possibility that the pilot chute could be deployed at a dynamic pressure of
400 lb/ft 2. Because of the concern for the loss of an SRB, the MPDRT, in late 1989, recommended a
rocket sled program to determine the opening shock fac_capability of the pilot chute, in the
summer of 1990, two rocket sled tests 7 were conducted for the pilot chute. Analysis of the test data
indicated a rated capability of only 272 lb/ft 2. A design study was subsequently initiated to incorporate
stronger components in certain critical areas of the pilot chute and to correct a design flaw discovered
during the rocket sled tests. This effort Ied tO a modified pilot chute design. In January 1991, the
modified pilot chute underwent a successful rocket sled test program, s Test results indicated a rated
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capabilityof 426 lb/ft2,makingthemodifiedpilot chuteadequatefor useon thecurrentSRB
configuration.Concernfor the lossof anSRBstill exists,however,becausethemodifiedpilot chuteis
notplannedfor flight useuntil thesummerof 1992.
7.3 Parachute Performance Data
The performance of the main chutes in decelerating the SRB's for water impact is one of the crit-
ical concerns for recovery. Practically every problem experienced with the recovery system has been
associated with the main parachute system. The drogue and pilot chutes are also critical because the fail-
ure of one of them results in loss of an SRB.
Fortunately, measured flight data have been obtained to evaluate the various recovery system
malfunctions thus far. The prime sources of this data have been parachute load cells, radar tracking
ships, photo aircraft, and an onboard motion picture camera mounted on the forward dome of the SRB
forward skirt. Data from these sources have often been used to develop a reconstruction of the entire
recovery phase to evaluate parachute performance. Such an evaluation is absolutely necessary to solve
recovery system problems and prevent the loss of an SRB. The reconstruction can also provide an
estimate of water impact velocity, which is important in determining the reuse capability of certain SRB
components.
Use of the parachute load cells and tracking ships has been discontinued, and budget constraints
are currently preventing the use of photo aircraft. The only remaining system to provide parachute data
is the SRB onboard motion picture camera. This camera has been useful in the past, but it is old and
requires a lot of maintenance. In addition, it is useless for night launches, which occur regularly.
The MPDRT proposes two improved methods for obtaining parachute data: (1) Replace the SRB
onboard motion picture camera system with a modern, self-contained video cassette camera and
recorder. The new video system would be a regular production item and would provide data even in
minimal lighting conditions. (2) Mount a self-contained instrumentation and data recorder package in the
frustum or forward skirt. Such a system could be used on every flight to provide data such as accelera-
tions, event times, and chute loads.
7.4 Prime Contractor Data Requirements
When Martin Marietta Corporation was originally under contract to NASA and later under con-
tract to USBI, they were obligated to publish a recovery system report after every launch. This report
stated the accuracy of load predictions, summarized parachute performance, and assessed parachute
damage. This type of data is valuable in producing parachute damage trends and correlations. Currently,
USBI is under contract for the recovery system and is not required to publish this report. This lack of
data from STS-26R to present has hindered the collecting of an accurate parachute historical data base.
37
8.0 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As part of its investigation, the MPDRT compiled a main parachute damage history for the first
29 shuttle flights (appendix B). After studying these data, the team concluded that there are two primary
sources of significant main parachute damage during deployment. The most frequent source of damage
is contact with the MPSS (isogrid and bipod struts). The other source is vent entanglement, which causes
the overstressing of horizontal ribbons and leads to parachute failure. The team identified a relatively
simple change to the parachute packing procedure (vent cap ties) that will prevent entanglement of the
vent.
The team investigated data correlations to determine if main parachute damage is related to vari-
ous parameters. Although a general lack of data hindered this study, some interesting results were noted.
These results are summarized in appendix B, section B.4, and should be considered before any future
changes are made to the SRB or recovery system.
The team selected the pilot chute-deployed soft pack as the most effective damage reduction
concept. Several alternatives are recommended that would result in a major reduction in deployment
damage at lower total cost than the pilot chute-deployed soft pack. The team also addressed issues
related to main parachute inflation, SRB recovery probability, and parachute data collection.
Specific recommendations of the team are as follows:
1. Incorporate vent cap ties as soon as possible to eliminate vent entanglement (paragraph 6.1)o
2. Proceed with implementation of one of the team's recommended concepts for eliminating
damage from contact with the MPSS (sections 2.0 and 3.0).
3. Resolve the recovery system-related issues identified in section 7.0.
4. Incorporate, at a convenient time, the main parachute enhancements described in paragraphs
6.2 through 6.10.
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9.0 CONCLUSION
The MPDRT made its recommendations to MSFC management in late 1989. MSFC has since
decided to implement several of the team's recommendations. First flight for these changes and other
recovery system improvements is scheduled for the summer of 1992 on STS-46.
One of the most significant changes to be implemented is the addition of vent cap ties to support
the main parachute vent cap (paragraph 6.1). The team urgently recommended this modification to
eliminate entanglement.
Main parachute changes described in paragraphs 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 are also to be implemented.
These involve reducing the canopy tie strength in the upper canopy area, relocating the canopy ties so
that the parachutes deploy without having to rotate eight gores, and using bidirectional tie loops for the
canopies.
The team recommended modifying the apex tie lanyard so it always strokes during main chute
deployment (paragraph 6.2). The decision was made, instead, to simply eliminate the lanyard.
The main parachute riser tack configuration will be changed to obtain a more circular shape for
the deployed canopies. This change was not included in the team's recommendations, but is scheduled to
be implemented.
Improvements will also be implemented for recovery system elements other than the main
parachutes. A stronger pilot chute will replace the current one, as the result of a team recommendation
(paragraph 7.2). Other changes have been initiated since the team completed its investigation. The
drogue parachute bag will be strengthened in several areas, and the attachment of the pilot chute to the
bag will also be strengthened. Finally, stronger bolts will be used in the MPSS to attach the ring splice
fittings to the isogrid panels (fig. 4). This change will allow the MPSS to meet the ultimate strength
requirement for the high axial load that occurs after frustum separation.
The combined effect of these changes, when implemented on STS-46, will be to reduce the prob-
ability of main parachute deployment damage and increase the probability of successful SRB recovery.
Even when a main parachute is damaged during deployment, the ripstops now used on all flights
(paragraph 1.2) will help prevent total parachute failure. In fact, ripstops have already been credited with
saving a main parachute from total failure on a 1991 flight.
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF ALL DAMAGE REDUCTION CONCEPTS CONSIDERED
The main parachute damage reduction team (MPDRT) developed 23 concepts for reducing main
parachute deployment damage. Team members independently derived pros and cons for each concept.
The individual efforts were then collected and tabulated for open discussion by the entire team. The 23
concepts are presented below with the pros and cons for each concept. Following each concept is a brief
summary of the team's evaluation.
Concept 1: Shorten Isogrid
This previously studied concept eliminates the lower bay of the isogrid and moves the bipod strut
connection up 14 inches to station 367.
Pros: Reduces contact with isogrid and bipod strut. No extensive testing required. Previous
engineering analysis available.
Cons: Parachutes will still contact frustum, isogrid, and bipod struts. Corners still exist. Possible
structural problems associated with attaching isogrid to station 367. Improvements are
uncertain.
The team concluded that this concept offers only marginal improvements at best and should not
be pursued. The team also considered cutting off more of the isogrid but decided it would be more effi-
cient to completely eliminate the isogrid. (See concept 2).
Concept 2: Delete Isogrid
This concept completely eliminates the isogrid and bipod struts. The cluster lateral load is
transmitted directly to the frustum.
Pros: Eliminates most probable cause of damage (contact with the isogrid and bipod struts).
Cons: Possible frustum beef-up to withstand cluster lateral loads. Still deploying out of rigid
container. Requires modification of GSE for clustering.
The team agreed that eliminating the isogrid would offer a significant improvement and selected
it as an alternative recommended concept. However, questions about frustum structural capability would
need to be addressed and resolved prior to proceeding with this concept.
Concept 3: Pilot Chute-Deployed Soft Pack
In this concept, the parachutes are mounted on the forward dome of the SRB forward skirt and
deployed by a cluster pilot chute. The cluster pilot chute is deployed by a bridle attached to the frustum.
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Pros: Eliminates damage due to contact with surrounding structure. Optimum bag strip veloci-
ties. Large pull-off angles accommodated. Traditional parachute deployment. Concept
has been studied extensively. Not sensitive to frustum dynamics.
Cons: Possible beef-up of forward skirt to support parachute packs. Requires extensive hard-
ware modification and system redesign. Requires drop tests. Requires new cluster pilot
chute development program. Longer time required to deploy main parachutes. Requires
additional flotation system and retrieval operation to recover deployment bags and cluster
pilot parachute. May increase first stage main parachute load. Requires new GSE.
The team concluded that this concept offers the best technical approach for solving the problem
of main parachute damage, and made it the top recommended concept.
Concept 3A: Pilot Chute-Deployed Soft Pack (Frustum Mounted)
This concept is similar to concept 3. Instead of being mounted on the dome, however, the system
is suspended within the frustum and uses an open-ended energy absorber to release the main chute
cluster.
Pros: Eliminates damage due to contact with surrounding structure. Optimum bag strip
velocities.
Cons: Requires extensive hardware modification and system redesign. Requires drop tests.
Requires new cluster pilot chute development program. Longer time required to deploy
main parachutes. Requires additional flotation system and retrieval operation to recover
deployment bags and cluster pilot parachute. May increase first stage main parachute
load. Requires GSE modification. Unpredictable parachute pack dynamics after release
from energy absorber.
The team concluded that although this concept is risky, it may be worth pursuing if costly
redesign and qualification testing of the dome prevents the development of concept 3.
Concept 4: Soft Pack With Delayed Release From Frustum
This concept keeps the cluster suspended in the frustum until just after frustum separation. The
cluster is released from the frustum on a bridle at approximately 0.6 seconds after frustum separation,
providing a soft-pack deployment. The delay allows the high deceleration at frustum separation (about
17 G's) to decay to about 5 G's before cluster release.
Pros: Eliminates damage due to contact with structure. Not very sensitive to frustum dynamics.
Cons: Extensive redesign required. Complex cluster release mechanism required. Drop testing
may be required. High bridle loads cause design problems. Requires GSE modification.
This concept received much consideration and was subsequently modified to include an energy
absorbing bridle. This modified concept then became alternative recommended concept 4A.
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Concept 4A: Soft Pack With Energy Absorber (Frustum Mounted)
This concept upgrades concept 4 by using energy absorbers to soften the release of the cluster
from the frustum. The energy absorbers support the cluster during ascent and reentry. At the time of
frustum separation, the high deceleration imparted by the drogue causes the cluster to exit the frustum
before parachute canopy deployment occurs. As in concept 4, the bags remain attached to the frustum by
a bridle arrangement.
Pros: Eliminates damage caused by contact with structure. Not very sensitive to frustum
dynamics.
Cons: Extensive redesign required. Energy absorber design requires much analysis. Requires
GSE modification.
The team spent a good deal of time developing this concept. It has a much lower cost than the
pilot chute-deployed soft pack, but is nearly as effective in reducing damage. The team selected concept
4A as one of its alternative recommended concepts.
Concept 5: External MPSS
The isogrid is eliminated and replaced with a smooth rigid-walled container to support the main
chute cluster. This concept is further enhanced by fairing the lower portion of the frustum to provide a
continuous smooth surface for parachute deployment.
Pros: Eliminates most probable cause of damage (contact with the isogrid and bipod struts).
Puts chutes in convenient transport container. Eliminates installation of aft bay instafoam.
Cons: Still deploying out of rigid container. Requires GSE modification.
This concept received much consideration and was selected as an alternative recommended
concept.
Concept 6: Banana Bag
The banana bag concept offers a soft deployment by using a double-walled deployment bag. The
S-folded bag is pulled completely clear of the frustum before the parachute begins to come out of the
bag. The outer bag then pulls at the edge of the inner bag to peel it, rather than strip it away from the
parachute.
Pros: Protects parachute during deployment (no sliding contact with structure or bag). Canopies
deploy when clear of frustum, providing soft pack effect.
Cons: Unknown dynamics involved. Much testing required. New bags required. Complicates
packing procedure. Requires modification to GSE.
This approach is too unconventional to be considered at this time for SRB application.
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Concept 7: Longer Drogue Suspension Lines
With this concept, the drogue is provided with longer suspension lines to reduce the effects of
wake overtake on the drogue and frustum.
Pros: Should provide additional stability to drogue to reduce frustum tilt angle.
Cons: Does not eliminate structural interference. Increases drogue bag strip velocity. May
require drogue modification. Improvements are uncertain. Nose cap volume is limited;
may require redesign.
Frustum tilt angle may be a significant contributor to the problem of structural contact, but it is
not certain that longer drogue suspension lines will alleviate the problem. The team concluded that this
concept offers only marginal improvements at best, with some serious disadvantages, and should not be
pursued.
Concept 8: Clustered Drogue
With this concept, the current drogue is replaced with a three-parachute cluster to increase sta-
bility and offset wake overtake effects, possibly reducing the frustum tilt angle.
Pros: Should provide more stability and reduce frustum tilt angle. Redundancy for drogue.
Cons: Does not eliminate structural interference. New drogues require major development pro-
gram. Drop testing required. Nose cap volume limited; may require redesign. Introduces
problems of nonuniform inflation, load sharing, and other problems associated with clus-
tering. Improvements uncertain.
It is not certain that a clustered drogue would significantly reduce frustum tilt angle. The team
concluded that this concept offers only marginal improvements at best and is far too complex and costly
to be considered for SRB application.
Concept 9: Larger Drogue
This concept replaces the current drogue with a larger parachute in order to reduce the dynamic
pressure at main parachute deployment.
Pros: Slightly lower main chute bag stripping velocity. Would allow more time on drogue for a
given altitude margin, thus providing more effective damping of SRB oscillation and
reducing frustum tilt angle. Lower frustum water impact velocity°
Cons: Does not eliminate structural interference. New drogue requires major development. Drop
testing required. Drogue loads increase significantly (may require frustum beef-up). Nose
cap volume is limited.
The team concluded that this concept represents a major change, would be costly to implement,
and would not sufficiently reduce main parachute damage.
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Concept 10: IncreaseTime onDrogue
This conceptrequiresthebaroswitch settings to be adjusted to allow more time for the drogue
parachute phase.
Pros: Minimal cost. No testing required. Helps prevent frustum separation from occurring near
drogue disreef (frustum high-G problem). Allows more time to dampen SRB oscillation.
Cons: Reduces altitude margin for main chutes. Does not eliminate structural interference.
Adjustable range of switch may be insufficient.
The team agreed that the baroswitch settings should be optimized, but that this concept by itself
would not significantly reduce main parachute damage.
Concept 11: Optimize Ties For Vent Cap and Canopy
This concept includes four important changes to the current main parachute tie arrangement.
These four changes are described in paragraphs 6.1 through 6.4 under the category of enhancements.
One change in particular, vent cap ties, is most urgently recommended by the team to prevent parachute
failure caused by vent entanglement.
Pros: Low cost. Easy to implement. Minimal system impacts and testing.
Cons: Does not eliminate structural interference.
Because of the relative ease of implementation of these four changes, the team grouped them in
section 6.0 with other recommended enhancements.
Concept 12: Soft Pack With Mortar-Type Deployment
This concept is similar to concept 4 except that the main parachute bags do not remain attached
to the frustum after being dropped out. Deployment is similar to a mortar-deployed system except that
the velocity relative to the SRB is generated by the drogue rather than a mortar.
Pros: Eliminates structural contact during deployment. Reduces bag strip velocity.
Cons: Proper bag strip not assured. Unconventional approach for large parachutes. Design of
cluster release mechanism could be difficult. Separate flotation system and retrieval
operations required for deployment bags. Drop test required.
The team concluded that this concept is not appropriate for SRB application because of unpre-
dictable behavior of the main parachute packs after release from the frustum.
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Concept13: MPSS Fairing to Frustum Exit
This concept extends the current isogrid with a smooth fairing to the frustum exit. This new
fairing has three compartments as does the current MPSS.
Pros: Eliminates contact with bipod struts. Eliminates need for aft bay instafoam.
Cons: Chutes still deployed from rigid container. Adds more length to isogrid for chutes to
contact. Parachute deployment dynamics may be worse for large frustum tilt angles.
The team concluded that this concept might actually increase main parachute damage.
Concept 14: Split Isogrid
This concept splits the isogrid approximately in half with the lower half being attached to the
SRB. The purpose is to retain lateral restraint until frustum separation at which time the lower half of the
isogrid remains attached to the SRB where it will not interfere with parachute deployment.
Pros: Removes significant portion of the isogrid as a potential damage source during deploy-
ment.
Cons: Major redesign of MPSS and forward skirt. Lower portion of isogrid may damage
parachute bags at frustum separation, and may interfere with main riser release, flotation
deployment, and SRB retrieval. Still deploying from rigid container. Improvements
uncertain. Requires GSE modification.
The team concluded that this concept should not be pursued because significant new problems
and damage sources would be created.
Concept 15: Separation Plane Moved Forward
This concept moves the frustum separation plane forward (higher) so that the bottoms of the
parachute bags are below the separation plane. Also, the isogrid is shortened.
Pros: Reduces probability of structural contact. Reduces frustum impact velocity.
Cons: Major redesign of frustum, MPSS, and forward skirt. Causes interference with main chute
risers, riser release, and main chute float deployment. Could make SRB retrieval and
towback more difficult. Still deploying from rigid container. Requires requalification of
ordnance. Much testing required. Improvements uncertain, especially with high frustum
tilt angles.
The team concluded that this concept should not be pursued because it represents a significant
change in the SRB configuration, and has other serious disadvantages.
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Concept 16: Lower Main Chute Pack in Frustum
In this concept, the forward dome of the SRB forward skirt is inverted, and the parachute packs
are lowered in the frustum such that the bottoms of the packs are below the separation plane.
Pros: Reduces probability of structural contact. Allows more volume for parachute packs.
Cons: Extensive hardware redesign. Requires roods to parachute packs. May complicate SRB
towback and increase towback loads on dome. Still deploying out of rigid container.
Requires GSE modifications.
The team agreed that the additional volume might prove useful, but that overall improvements
are not worth the high cost of implementation.
Concept 17: Frustum Fairing
A frustum fairing is added to the lower portion of the frustum.
Pros: Provides smoother exit from frustum. Eliminates need for aft bay instafoam. Inexpensive.
Cons: Does not eliminate structural interference.
The team agreed that a frustum fairing may slightly alleviate the structural contact problem, but
would not by itself sufficiently reduce main parachute damage. Concept 5, one of the alternative
recommended concepts, includes a frustum fairing as do concepts 13 and 18.
Concept 18: Individual Rigid Containers
This concept replaces each current deployment bag with a rigid deployment container with inte-
gral fairing. The three containers are joined to form an assembly which would replace the current MPSS.
Pros: Eliminates contact with bipod struts. Eliminates need for aft bay instafoam.
Cons: Chutes still deployed from rigid container. Improvements uncertain. New GSE required.
The team agreed that this concept would not sufficiently reduce main parachute damage because
the three containers form an internal structure similar to the current isogrid.
Concept 19: Jettison Nozzle Extension at Apogee
The SRB nozzle extension is presently jettisoned during the main parachute phase of recovery
just before water impact. Separating the extension at apogee would significantly reduce the severity of
the deployment conditions for the drogue and main parachutes. This reduction occurs because of an
increase in SRB tail-fin'st aerodynamic drag without the extension.
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Pros: Easyto implement.Milder deploymentconditions.Eliminatesnozzleextensionbreak-up
which threatensdrogueparachute(potentiallossof SRB).
Cons: Exposes interior of aft skirt to much more severe environment. Affects reuse of thrust
vector control system components.
The team agreed that, from a recovery system standpoint, it is an excellent idea to jettison the
extension at apogee. In fact, it has been done on two earlier flights. The problem, however, is the severe
damage inside the aft skirt on these two flights. MSFC management has determined that from an overall
standpoint, the high cost of this damage outweighs any parachute advantages.
Concept 20: Bridle-Deployed Soft Pack on Dome
In this concept, the parachutes are mounted on the forward dome of the SRB forward skirt and
are deployed by a bridle attached to the frustum.
Pros: Eliminates damage due to structural contact. Not sensitive to frustum dynamics.
Cons: Possible beef-up of forward skirt. Extensive redesign. Requires drop tests. Very high
bridle loads; main chutes get snatched violently off dome. Requires new GSE.
Problems associated with bridle loads led to development of concept 21.
Concept 21: Energy Absorber-Deployed Soft Pack on Dome
This concept is similar to concept 20 except that the parachutes are deployed by an energy
absorbing bridle.
Pros: Eliminates damage due to structural contact. Not sensitive to frustum dynamics.
Cons: Possible beef-up of forward skirt. Extensive redesign. Requires drop tests. Requires new
GSE.
The team concluded that this concept is worthwhile, but not worth the cost. It was essentially
combined with concept 4 to become concept 4A, an alternative recommended concept. In concept 4A,
suspending the parachutes in the frustum with energy absorbers removes the disadvantages associated
with mounting the parachutes on the dome.
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APPENDIX B
MAIN PARACHUTE DAMAGE HISTORY AND CAUSE ASSESSMENT
One task of the main parachute damage reduction team (MPDRT) was to review the history of
parachute damage. In performing this task, the team compiled a summary of significant damage to the
main parachutes and reevaluated the damage sources (section B. 1). In addition, the team compiled a
large amount of SRB flight data and parachute loads data (section B.2). A correlation analysis was then
performed to determine if certain flight conditions contribute to main parachute damage (sections B.3
and B.4). Data in this appendix include the first 29 shuttle flights, through STS-30R. With minimal
exceptions, data were obtained from the following sources: Martin Marietta Corporation postflight
parachute reports; MSFC STS flight evaluation reports; and data presentations and memos. These
sources are listed in the bibliography (section B.5).
The team obtained the data necessary to thoroughly review significant main parachute damage
and damage causes. However, many of the SRB flight data and parachute loads data required for corre-
lation analyses do not exist, or, in a few cases, could not be readily obtained. The amount of missing
data can be seen in examining the figures associated with section B.2.
This appendix represents the first time all of the above data have been compiled and assembled
in one document. It would be beneficial to the space shuttle program to keep this data base current.
B.1 Main Parachute Damage
A numbering system exists for main parachute ribbons which can be used to locate parachute
damage. The skirt band at the bottom of the canopy is defined as horizontal ribbon No. 1, and each suc-
cessive horizontal ribbon is numbered consecutively. The vent band is horizontal ribbon No. 264 for the
small (115-ft diameter) main parachutes, and No. 304 for the current large (136-ft diameter) main
parachutes. After inflation problems occurred on the first few flights with the large mains, 13 horizontal
ribbons were added above the vent band to form a vent cap to reduce the effective vent area. The upper-
most of the 13 horizontal ribbons (No. 317) is called the vent cap band. The first flight with this vent
modification was STS-51F in July 1985.
An orderly system is used to define main parachute gore numbers, as shown in figure B-1 for the
large mains. The small mains only have 96 gores, compared to 160 for the large mains, but the basic
gore numbering system for each is similar in that for the deployed parachute the highest numbered gore
is the furthest outboard. The main parachute position numbering system for a flight set of six chutes is
also shown in figure B-l, and is the same for small or large parachutes.
A much more detailed damage record has been kept for the large main parachutes than for the
small main parachutes. The detail of the large main parachute damage reports permits the damage to be
compared to a critical flaw size. Critical flaw size indicates the approximate number of consecutively
broken ribbons in a single gore that will cause propagation of the damage along the gore. The critical
flaw size changes in different areas of the parachute. For the large mains, in the lightly loaded lower
region which includes the skirt band through horizontal ribbon No. 100, the critical flaw size is 30
ribbons. For the moderately loaded region, horizontal ribbons 101 through 190, the critical flaw size is
22 ribbons. The critical flaw size is 16 ribbons for the region of horizontal ribbons 191 through 235, and
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Left-hand SRB Right-hand SRB
Main Parachute
.Main Parachute Position 2
Position 3 Main Parachute Main Parachute
Posi_on 2 PosUbon 3
Note: (1) View looking up into SRB frustrurrw (shown greatly oversized).
(2) Gore numbers are indicated around circumference of deployed parachutN.
Figure B- 1. Gore numbering system for large main parachutes.
12 ribbons for the highest Ioaded region, which includes horizontal ribbons 236 through the vent band
(horizontal ribbon 304). These critical flaw size data apply only to the large mains without ripstops.
Critical flaw size is also a function of total parachute load. The above values are given for a
nominally loaded parachute. If a given parachute has a higher than nominal total load, the critical flaw
size is smaller for each region of the parachute. Conversely, if the total load is lower than nominal, the
critical flaw size is larger. For the large mains, if the number of consecutively broken ribbons is defined
as "near-critical flaw size" or greater, the damage is considered significant.
For i.he small mains' the damage was generally reported in terms of the total number of broken
ribbons, The locations of the broken ribbons were not identified unless a "large" number of broken
ribbons occurred in conjunction with vent band damage. If any small main parachute sustained this level
of damage or greater, the damage is considered significant.
The following main parachute damage history is divided into two sections: one for the small
main parachutes and one for _e large main parachutes. Only significant damage that occurred during
flight is included; no retrieval damage is described. A condensed tabulation of the 14 incidences of sig-
nificant main parachute damage is presented in figure B-2. As a result of the team's reevaluation of
damage sources, three of the original diagnoses have been changed: STS-1, STS-9, and STS-51B.
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STS
Mission
STS-1
STS-3
STS-9
STS-11
STS-13
STS-13
STS-51D
STS-51B
STS-51G
STS-51F
STS-61C
STS-26R
STS-29
STS-30R
Damaged
Chute
LH #3
RH #2
LH #3
LH #3
RH #2
LH #2
LH #3
LH #3
LH #3
RH #3
LH #3
RH #3
RH #2
LH #2
GoreWith
Most
Damage
#45
#3
#57
#39
#47
#18
#80
#59
#87
#103
#74
#121
#155
#93
Numberof
Tom
Ribbons
inGore
43
250
251
257
241
262
15
240
132
317
14
18
23
315
Causeof Damage
Contactwith MPSS
Floatentanglement
Contactwith MPSS
Ventdynamicscausedby MPSScontact
Contactwith MPSS
Contactwith MPSS
Chute-to-chutecontact
Vententanglement
Ventrebounding
Contactwith MPSS(Note:Propagationof initial
tearthroughoutentiregorewascausedby
reefinganomaly)
Unknown
Contactwith MPSS
Contactwith MPSS
Vententanglement
FigureB-2. Summaryof significantmainparachutedamage.
B.I.1 Significant Small Main Parachute Damage History
STS-1 Damage to LH main parachute No. 3 consisted of a 43-ribbon tear at gore 45 up to, but not
including, the vent band, which was damaged.
The tear was originally attributed to parachute contact with a nut cap in the lower part of the
frustum, or possibly a flailing retrieval line. However, upon reevaluation, the team deter-
mined that this damage was caused by contact with the MPSS, most likely the isogrid.
STS-3 Damage to the RH main parachute No. 2 consisted of: a 250-ribbon tear in gore 3 (horizontal
ribbons 14 through 263); a tear in gore No. 2 consisting of 34 ribbons just below the vent
band; a break in the vent band at radial No. 3 between gores 2 and 3; broken vent line No. 51
(continuation of vent line 3).
Damage to the canopy is the result of entanglement of the float on main chute No. 2 with the
float on main chute No. 1. Float entanglement resulted from float dynamic motions aggra-
vated by the 30-degree tilt angle of the frustum during main chute deployment.
STS-9 Gore 57 on the LH main chute No. 3 was damaged. The vent band (horizontal 264) and all
horizontal ribbons down through No. 14 were torn. On the adjacent gore, No. 58, the 77 hori-
zontal ribbons nearest the vent band were also torn, although the vent band was not.
This damage was originally attributed to abrasion of the horizontal ribbons against the floats
or deployment bag. However, the team determined that this damage was caused by contact
with the MPSS, most likely the isogrid.
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STS-11
STS-13
B.1.2
STS-51D
STS-51B
STS-51G
On LH mainparachuteNo. 3,gore39split from horizontal8 through264,thevent band.
Friction burnswereprevalentfrom horizontal237throughtheventbandandonvent lines.
This damageis attributedto ventdynamicsduringdeploymentthatresultedin high-speed
fabric-to-fabriccontactbetweentheventandotherupperportionsof thesamecanopy,or
between adjacent canopies. Vent dynamic behavior is considered to be caused by contact
with the MPSS.
On RH main chute No. 2, gore 47 was torn from ribbon 24 through 264.
On LH main chute No. 2, all horizontal ribbons in gore 18 except the skirt and vent bands
were torn.
The damage on both these parachutes is attributed to the canopy being dragged across the
isogrid or bipod struts during deployment.
Significant Large Main Parachute Damage History
Gore 80 on LH main chute No. 3 sustained 15 broken horizontal ribbons, from 207 through
220 and 222. This damage is considered a near-critical flaw size in this area of the canopy.
The damage is attributed to the vent area of LH chute No. 2 striking chute No. 3 during
deployment.
Damage to LH chute No. 3 included horizontal ribbons torn from No. 65 through the vent
band (No. 304) in gore 59, and horizontals 12 through 303 in gore 61. No horizontals were
torn in gore 60.
Though the evidence was inconclusive, the damage was originally attributed to retrieval.
However, upon reexamination by the team, the evidence supports an in-flight damage
scenario. This evidence includes vent line burning and vent band stitch failures, suggesting
vent entanglement like the STS-30R failure.
Damage to LH main chute No. 3 consisted of 132 tom horizontal ribbons, from No. 173
through the vent band in gore 87. There was also extensive burning and abrasion damage
along a line intersecting gore 87 near horizontal ribbon 248.
This damage was self-inflicted and was attributed to vent rebounding. The evidence obtained
from a photo aircraft indicates that the vent whipped over during deployment and contacted
the outside of the canopy. This initial contact damage was centered at ribbon 248 in gore 87,
and propagated along the gore.
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STS-51F
STS-61C
STS-26R
STS-29
STS-30R
Theinitial deploymentdamageto RH chuteNo. 3 wasa tearin gore103.The SRBonboard
film indicatesthis tearconsistedof about10to 15consecutivehorizontalribbonslocated
nearribbon270.(Critical flaw sizeis 12ribbonsin thisareaof thecanopy.)Subsequent
damageto this chuteresultedin it beingnearlyrippedapart.Gore 103wascompletelysplit,
andthesplit continuedacrosstheventanddowngore33almostto theskirt band.Therewas
alsoalargeamountof burndamage,morethananypreviouslargemainchute.
Thecauseof the initial tearandburndamagewascontactwith theMPSSthatresultedfrom a
largefrustumtilt angleduringdeployment.All indicationsarethatthis initial tearwould not
havepropagatedundernormalconditions.However,on thisparachute,thefirst-stageand
second-stagereefing lineswereroutedthroughoneof thefirst stagecutters.Theparachute
attemptedto inflate to full openatfirst stagedisreef,causingtheinitial tear to propagateinto
acompletecanopyfailure.Becauseof theinitial tear,thechutefailedat afairly low loadof
153,000lb.
In gore74of LH mainchuteNo.3, anear-criticalflaw sizeof 14consecutivebrokenribbons
occurred(233through246).
It is notclearwhatcausedthisdamage.Thereisnowitnesspaint,andonly very little burn
damageassociatedwith this tear.It is in anareaof high incidenceof damage,adjacentto the
MPSS,but thereis nostrongevidencethattheparachutecontactedtheMPSS.
Damageconsistedof anear-criticalflaw sizeof 18consecutivetorn ribbons(131through
148)in gore 121of RH chuteNo. 3.
All indications,includingpink witnesspaint,arethatthiswasbipodstrutdamage.
Damageto RH chuteNo.2 consistedof 23consecutiveribbonstorn (121through143)in
gore 155.
All indications,includingpink witnesspaint,arethatthiswasbipodstrutdamage.
Damageto LH mainchuteNo.2 consistedof asplit in gore93 from horizontal3 throughthe
ventcapband(No.317).Theadjacentgore,No.94,wastornfrom horizontalribbon269
throughtheventband(No.304).Theventcapareawasalsoheavilydamaged.
Thedamageis attributedto vent entanglement caused by lack of support of the main
parachute vent cap combined with a large frustum tilt angle of 25 °. At deployment, the vent
area had fallen inside the circle of the vent band. During the violent whipping action, entan-
glement of the vent lines ensued. The vent was drawn together between gores 1 and 30 and
made smaller, causing the vent lines to be too long to react radial loads over the top of the
parachute. With this vent band foreshortening, the large radial loads were reacted in hoop
stress in the upper horizontal ribbons, causing parachute failure.
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B.2 SRB and Parachute Data
This section presents tabular listings of the SRB flight data and parachute loads data compiled by
the team to investigate correlations with main parachute damage. As mentioned previously, the data
were obtained primarily from the reports, data presentations, and memos listed in the bibliography.
B.2.1 Data Measurement Methods __
In the course of the shuttle program, several different data measurement methods have been used
to determine the behavior of SRB's during reentry and the performance of the recovery system. These
methods are discussed below.
B.2.1.1 Radar Tracking Ships
Two radar tracking ships, the Vandenberg and the Redstone, were used at various times early in
the program. When properly equipped, each ship could provide tracking with both radar and high-quality
motion picture cameras. A complete set of trajectory parameters, including angle of attack, could often
be obtained for a significant portion 0fthe S_reentry and parachute phases. The Vandenberg, which
was used only on the first five flights, ri6maailyhad the equipmentto track both of the SRB's with
radars and cameras. The Redstone was not as well equipped. On either ship, the radars and cameras
would occasionally lose target or would track the wrong SRB, but the tracking data were very useful in
evaluating SRB reentry and recovery. Eachship also had an "Omegas0nd" system that could be carded
aloft by balloon to obtain atmospheric measurements.
B.2.1.2 Development Flight Instrumentation
Development flight instrumentation (DFI) has been used on board the SRB's several times to
provide data for ascent, reentry, and recovery. The DFI package is tailored for each flight to meet spe-
cific requirements. Typical recovery-related data measured by DFI include event times, parachute loads,
SRB accelerations, and baroswitch plenum chamber pressure.
B.2.1.3 Photo Aircraft and SRB Onboard Cameras
One or tWO photo aircraft were available for the SRB's on almost every daytime shuttle launch
through 1990. The aircraft were a WC-130, which carded a Starcast system, and a P-3, which carried a
Cast Glance system. Each system had several motion picture cameras, and the aircraft were positioned to
photograph the parachutes. Data from these camera systems were of great importance to the program;
however, cloud cover sometimes limited photographic coverage.
SRB onboard motion picture cameras were first used on the second flight with large main chutes,
and have been used often since. Because the cameras are located on the forward dome of the SRB for-
ward skirt, only the main chutes can be photographed. Much valuable data have been derived from these
cameras, and the data were especially useful in diagnosing the STS-30R failure.
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B.2.1.4 Land.Based Radars
Beginning with STS-5, land-based radar has been used on each flight to track the SRB's during
reentry. Normally, two radar sites are used, one for each SRB. Land-based radars cannot provide any
information about the parachutes because the SRB's have descended below the horizon before the start
of the parachute sequence. However, land-based radars typically provide good tracking of the SRB's for
approximately 3 minutes after separation. The apogee altitude can be derived from the tracking data, and
often the magnitude of the maximum dynamic pressure (Qmax) during reentry can be approximated.
B.2.1.5 Trajectory Reconstruction
Trajectory reconstruction can sometimes be used to determine a desired parameter for which no
direct measurement was made during flight. The technique is valid even if available flight data are
limited to such items as event times, photographic coverage, and observations from personnel on the
retrieval ships. The inputs to the parachute dynamics computer simulation are incremented until the
simulation results match the flight data. The simulated value of the desired parameter can then be used
as an estimate for that parameter.
B.2.2 Availability of Data Measurement Methods
Figure B-3 presents a summary of the data measurement methods available for each shuttle
flight. Flights are identified by a sequential flight number, STS mission designation, and launch date.
For each flight, the presence of a tracking ship (either the Vandenberg or Redstone), the Cast Glance and
Starcast photo aircraft, and SRB onboard cameras is indicated, as well as whether meteorological data at
the impact were measured. In addition to the shuttle flight identification, each SRB in a flight set is
identified. For each SRB, the presence of DFI, and drogue and main chute load cells in particular, is
indicated. Next, tracking ship and photographic coverage for each SRB are indicated, and general com-
ments on the quality and usability of the film are provided. No indication is given for land-based radars
because they are now used on all flights.
B.2.3 SRB Trajectory Parameters
SRB trajectory parameters are presented in figure B-4. For each SRB, the parameters listed are:
SRB separation time and altitude; apogee time and altitude; Qmax during reentry and the time and alti-
tude at which it occurred; water impact time; and water impact vertical and horizontal velocities. Time is
given in seconds relative to lift-off. Velocity is given in feet per second fit/s), altitude in feet (ft), and
dynamic pressure in pounds per square foot 0b/ft2). Values for horizontal water impact velocity are
often based on the wind speed.
Only one apogee altitude value is listed for each flight. Based on experience, the assumption is
made that both SRB's on each flight have identical apogees. Only one reentry Qmax value is listed for
each flight, even though small differences between Qmax values for the LH and RH SRB's have been
observed. For this study, it was considered adequate to use one Qmax value for both SRB's on each
flight. As a general rule, Qmax occurs at an altitude of between 40,000 and 50,000 ft.
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B.2.4 Nose Cap Separation Data
B.3 Main Parachute Damage Correlation With Flight Data
The team investigated data correlations to dete_ine if main parachute deployment damage is
related to certain flight parameters. Although this appendix_ffcludes the first 29-shUitle flights, _e
SRB's on two of those flights, STS-4 and STS-51L, were not recovered by parachute. The sample size
for this correlation study is therefore 27 flights (54 SRB's). Of these 54 SRB's, 25 had small mains and
29 had large mains. The odd numbers are caused by the fact that STS-41D had large mains on only the
RH SRB. Significant deployment damage occurred on 6 of the 25 SRB's recovered with small mains,
and on 8 of the 29 SRB_'s recovered with large mains.
Figure B-5 displays the following data for each SRB: time (relative to lift-off) and altitude (ft) at
which nose cap separation occurs; SRB angle of attack, alpha (in degrees); SRB roll angle (though this
parameter was not available); SRB velocity (ft/s) and dynamic pressure (lb/ft2); and drogue parachute
stripping velocity fit/s).
B.2.5 Frustum Separation Data
Figure B-6 shows the frustum separation conditions. These parameters are defined like those
presented in figure B-5 for nose cap separation. Additional information consists of drogue hang time and
frustum tilt angle (degrees). Drogue hang time is the elapsed time in seconds between nose cap separa-
tion and frustum separation. Frustum tilt angle is the angle between the frustum centerline and parachute
canopy centerlines at line stretch. High frustum tilt angles cause parachute contact with the isogrid.
Measurement of the tilt angle requires photo aircraft film coverage such that the plane of the tilt angle is
nearly parallel to the plane of the camera lens. The few values presented in figure B-6 are approximate.
It should be noted that the unreasonably low (16.00 seconds) drogue hang time originally pub-
lished for the LH SRB on STS-13 has been corrected by obtaining a better estimate of the nose cap sepa-
ration time.
B.2.6 SRB Weight and CG Data
The weight and longitudinal CG location at SRB separation are shown in figure B-7. The weight
is given in pounds 0b), and the CG location is specified by SRB station number (inches).
B.2.7 Drogue and Main Parachute Loads Data
Figure B-8 shows parachute peak load values (in thousands of pounds) for only those flights with
load cells. The predicted nominal and dispersed parachute peak loads are given for comparison to the
measured loads for each SRB. The main parachute position numbers (1, 2, and 3) are identified. Drogue
and main chute loads are listed for each deployment stage such that the first, second, and third peak
loads correspond to initial inflation, first disreef, and second disreef, respectively. STS-27R was the last
flight with parachute load cells.
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Becausesomeof theflight dataarenotavailable,asmentionedearlier,manyinterestingsus-
pectedcorrelationscouldnot beinvestigated.For instance,flight historyshowsthattherehasneverbeen
significantdamageto mainparachuteNo. 1oneithertheLH or RH SRB.Thiswould seemto indicatea
correlationwith SRBangularorientation,butnoanalysiscanbedonebecauseof ascarcityof data.
FigureB-9 showsthecorrelationbetweenSRBweightatseparationandmainchutedamage.
Weightdataareavailablefor all of the54 SRB'sin this study.Thedarkenedsymbolsrepresenthose
SRB'swith significantlydamagedmainchutes.Althoughthedamageis fairly evenlyscatteredthrough-
out theupperfour-fifths of theweightrange,nosignificantdamageoccurredonanyof the 10SRB's
weighinglessthan179,500lb, implying aweakcorrelation.
FiguresB-10andB-11presenthecorrelationbetweenSRBlongitudinalCG locationatsepara-
tion andmainchutedamage.CG dataareavailablefor all of the54SRB's.The rankedvaluesof SRB
CG stationin figure B- 11 are given in descending order (high station numbers represent aft CG
locations). It can be seen in figure B- 11 that the parachute damage probability increases for an aft CG
location. Of the 14 SRB's on which significant damage occurred, 9 had CG's in the top half of the
ranking, and 6 had CG's in the top quarter of the ranking. This trend is considered a moderate
correlation.
The correlation between apogee altitude and main chute damage is shown in figures B-12 and B-
13. The two SRB's on each flight are assumed to have identical apogees for this study, and apogee data
exist for all 27 flights. Although the occurrence of main parachute damage is distributed throughout the
range of apogees in figure B-13, the top quarter of the ranking has a higher probability of damage than
any of the other quarters. In fact, damage occurred on the three flights with the highest apogees. Overall,
main parachute damage is considered to have a weak correlation with apogee altitude.
Figure B-14 shows the correlation between reentry Qmax and main chute damage. Data exist for
all 27 flights. For this study, the two SRB's on each flight are assumed to have identical Qmax values.
There is a definite increase in damage probability between the four flights with the lowest Qmax values
and the four flights with the highest values, implying a weak correlation.
Figure B-15 shows the correlation between drogue hang time and main chute damage. Hang time
data exist for 44 of the 54 SRB's, and indicates a weak correlation with parachute damage. No signifi-
cant damage occurred on any of the eight SRB's with hang times greater than 24 s, while the two SRB's
with the shortest hang times incurred damage. It appears that longer hang times allow SRB oscillations
to damp out as much as possible before the main chutes are deployed, thereby reducing the potential for
main chute damage.
The correlation between frustum tilt angle and main chute damage is shown in figure B-16. Tilt
angle data are available for only 13 SRB's. The data show that large tilt angles, as expected, cause a
drastic increase in damage probability. However, because of the small sample size, no evaluation was
made of the correlation.
The team investigated several multiple parameter damage correlations, the most interesting of
which is presented in figure B-17. This figure shows the combined effect of dynamic pressure at nose
cap separation and longitudinal CG location. These data are available for only 14 SRB's, 12 of which
had small mains. The figure shows that the probability of main chute deployment damage increases
when a rear CG location is combined with high dynamic pressure at nose cap separation. Because of the
small sample size, however, no definite conclusions could be drawn.
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Figure B-9. Correlation between SRB weight at separation and main parachute damage.
69
1,280
1,278
1,276
1,274
1,272
1,270
g
_ 1,268
1,266
1,264
0 1,260
In
(/) 1,258
1,256
1,254
1,252
1,250
0
[]
[]
0 e
[]
0
[]
0
0 [] []
0 0 0
@ []
[] •
[]
0
DII
0
[]
[]
Flight 0 LH SRB No Damage
[] RH SRB No Damage
• LH SRB Damage
• RH SRB Damage
Figure B-10. Correlation between SRB longitudinal CG location and main parachute damage.
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CGStation Parachute
Ranking Flight SRB (Inches) Damage
1 STS-13 Left 1,272.17 Damage
2 STS-13 Right 1,270.83 Damage
3 STS-51C Right 1,269.73
4 STS -9 Right 1,269.40
5 STS-30R Right 1,268.74
6 STS-51C Left 1,268.22
7 STS-41G Right 1,267.98
8 STS-11 Left 1,267.96 Damage
9 STS-11 Right 1,267.52
10 STS -30R Left 1,267.28 Damage
11 STS-41D Left 1,267.05
12 STS-41G Left 1,266.29
13 STS-9 Left 1,266.20 Damage
14 STS-29 Right 1,266.04 Damage
15 STS-8 Left 1,265.82
16 STS-26R Left 1,264.83
17 STS-8 Right 1,264.56
18 STS-27R Left 1,264.55
19 STS-26R Right 1,264.46 Damage
20 STS-51G Left 1,264.33 Damage
21 STS -27R R ight 1,264.31
22 STS-51G Right 1,263.86
23 STS-29 Left 1,263.75
24 STS-7 Left 1,262.46
25 STS-51F Left 1,262.26
26 STS-51F Right 1,261.68 Damage
27 STS-7 Right 1,261.59
28 STS-61A Left 1,261.55
29 STS-51J Right 1,261.33
30 STS-51J Left 1,261.25
31 STS-61B Right 1,261.08
32 STS-5 Right 1,261.04
33 STS-511 Left 1,260.98
34 STS-61B Left 1,260.86
35 STS-5 Left 1,260.86
36 STS-51I Right 1,260.77
37 STS-61C Right 1,260.70
38 STS-61C Left 1,260.59 Damage
39 STS-61A Right 1,260.51
40 STS-51B Right 1,260.32
41 STS-51D Right 1,260.31
42 STS-51B Left 1,260.28 Damage
43 STS-51D Left 1,259.67 Damage
44 STS-51A Right 1,259.64
45 STS-6 Right 1,259.34
46 STS-2 Left 1,25g.97
47 STS-51A Left 1,258.58
48 STS-6 Left 1,258.43
49 STS-3 Left 1,258.21
50 STS-41D Right 1,257.73
51 STS-1 Left 1,257.61 Damage
52 STS-3 Right 1,257.06 Damage
53 STS-2 Right 1,256.77
54 STS- 1 Right 1,254.85
Figure B-11. Correlation between SRB longitudinal CG location and main parachute
damage (ranked values).
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Apogee Parachute
Ranking Flight (ft) Damage
1 STS-1 275,000 Damage
2 STS-13 268,000 DamageonbothSRB's
3 STS-51G 258,000 Damage
4 STS-2 257,000
5 STS-41D 253,000
6 STS-3 247,000 Damage
7 STS-9 242,000 Damage
8 STS-61A 241,800
9 STS-41G 234,000
10 STS-51B 234,000 Damage
11 STS-51I 234,000
12 STS-51J 233,700
13 STS-26R 232,800 Damage
14 STS-51A 231,000
15 STS-51C 231,000
16 STS-30R 230,700 Damage
17 STS-51F 228,000 Damage
18 STS-27R 226,500
19 STS-29 226,000 Damage
20 STS-5 225,000
21 STS-51D 224,000 Damage
22 STS-6 220,000
23 STS-7 220,000
24 STS-8 219,000
25 STS-61C 218,000 Damage
26 STS-61B 211,300
27 STS-11 210,000 Damage
FigureB-13. CorrelationbetweenSRBapogeealtitudeandmainparachutedamage
(rankedvalues).
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Figure B-14. Correlation between SRB reentry Qmax and main parachute damage.
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B.4 DamageCorrelation Summary
Theteamaccomplishedits objectiveof finding cause-and-effect relationships between flight
parameters and significant main chute damage. Although not enough data exist to conduct rigorous cor-
relation studies, the results are still considered valid. Moderate and weak correlations were observed that
relate an increase in significant main parachute deployment damage to the following five parameter
changes:
1. Increase in SRB weight
2. Rearward shift in SRB CG location
3. Increase in SRB apogee altitude
4. Increase in SRB reentry Qmax
5. Decrease in drogue hang time.
It has been known since the early years of the shuttle program that these parameter changes,
along with others, are generally detrimental to SRB recovery. The damage correlations identified in this
study confirm the importance of these parameters. The effects of these parameters should be taken into
account when future changes are considered for the SRB or recovery system.
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